

EUROPEAN ENERGY AND TRANSPORT

Scenarios on high oil and gas prices

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
SCENARIOS ON HIGH OIL AND GAS PRICES	9
1.1. INTRODUCTION.....	9
1.2. THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK UNDER ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES AVAILABILITY ASSUMPTIONS	9
1.2.1. <i>The “World Baseline” scenario</i>	10
1.2.2. <i>The “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” and “World soaring oil and gas prices” scenario</i>	13
1.3. THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE.....	17
1.3.1. <i>Modelling approach.....</i>	17
1.3.2. <i>“Medium gas and soaring oil prices” scenario results for EU-25.....</i>	17
1.3.2.1. Overview of main results	17
1.3.2.2. Final energy demand	19
1.3.2.3. Electricity and steam generation	22
1.3.2.4. CO ₂ emissions and concluding remarks	24
1.4. “SOARING OIL AND GAS PRICES” SCENARIO RESULTS FOR EU-25.....	26
GLOSSARY	29
APPENDIX 1: “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE RESULTS	33
SUMMARY RESULTS BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (COMPARISON TO BASELINE).....	33
APPENDIX 2: “SOARING OIL AND GAS PRICES” CASE RESULTS	47
SUMMARY RESULTS BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (COMPARISON TO BASELINE).....	47

List of figures

FIGURE 2-1: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PRICES FOR THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET UNDER ALTERNATIVE WORLD SCENARIOS	14
FIGURE 3-1: CHANGES IN FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY FUEL IN EU-25 (DIFF. FROM BASELINE IN MTOE) IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	21
FIGURE 3-2: CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY ENERGY FORM IN EU-25 (DIFF. FROM BASELINE IN TWH) IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	22
FIGURE 3-3: CHANGES IN CO ₂ EMISSIONS IN EU-25 (DIFF. FROM BASELINE IN MT CO ₂) IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	25

List of Tables


TABLE 2-1: KEY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE “WORLD BASELINE” SCENARIO	10
TABLE 2-2: WORLD PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN THE “WORLD BASELINE” SCENARIO	11
TABLE 2-3: KEY INDICATORS FOR THE WORLD ENERGY SYSTEM IN THE “WORLD BASELINE” SCENARIO	12
TABLE 2-4: PRIMARY ENERGY PRICES IN THE “WORLD BASELINE” SCENARIO	13
TABLE 2-5: WORLD PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN THE “WORLD MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” SCENARIO	15
TABLE 2-6: KEY INDICATORS FOR THE WORLD ENERGY SYSTEM IN THE “WORLD MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” SCENARIO	16
TABLE 2-7: KEY INDICATORS FOR THE WORLD ENERGY SYSTEM IN THE “SOARING OIL AND GAS PRICES” SCENARIO	16
TABLE 3-1: PRIMARY ENERGY DEMAND IN EU-25 IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	18
TABLE 3-2: IMPORT DEPENDENCY IN EU-25 IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	19
TABLE 3-3: FINAL ENERGY DEMAND AND CO ₂ EMISSION BY SECTOR IN EU-25 IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	19
TABLE 3-4: INSTALLED CAPACITY BY PLANT TYPE IN EU-25 IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	23
TABLE 3-5: FUEL INPUT IN THE EU-25 POWER GENERATION SECTOR IN THE “MEDIUM GAS AND SOARING OIL PRICES” CASE	24
TABLE 4-1: EVOLUTION OF PRIMARY ENERGY NEEDS IN THE EU-25 ENERGY SYSTEM IN THE “SOARING OIL AND GAS PRICES” CASE	26

Executive Summary

For the last few years, the EU has experienced rising import prices for oil and gas, which have reached in summer 2006 unprecedented levels in nominal terms. Oil and gas prices may continue rising and it is no longer only a remote possibility that the oil price could reach a level of 100 \$ per barrel in money of 2005 in say 2030. In any case, it is worthwhile to examine the energy consequences of such possible developments given that energy import prices are one key driver for the development of EU-25 energy demand and supply. In the past gas prices have followed oil prices rather closely. While this cannot be excluded as a possible future development even under very high oil prices, an alternative development might materialise, in which gas prices would decouple somewhat more from oil prices. Therefore two alternative scenarios have been examined, addressing different pathways for the evolution of the world energy system and their impact on energy import prices for the EU-25:

- The “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case has oil prices close to 100\$ per barrel in real terms on the assumption of higher economic growth in parts of Asia (China, India and other Asian developing countries) in combination to relatively less abundant resources than in the Baseline1 scenario. Furthermore, this case is characterised by the assumption that gas prices are no longer linked with the oil price.
- In the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case with the same oil price path, the assumptions as regards economic growth and availability of fossil fuel resources are identical to those of the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case; but gas prices remain linked to the evolution of the oil price.

International energy prices for Europe under alternative scenarios



Source: POLES.

¹ See European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030 – update 2005 available from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2005/index_en.htm

The projections for the energy import prices in the two alternative scenarios derive from the output of the POLES model, as was the case for the Baseline scenario. The two alternative price scenarios focus on the impacts that faster world economic growth in combination with relatively less abundant resources could have on the evolution of international fuel prices, which in turn affects the world energy outlook. World GDP grows at a rate of 3.3% pa in 2001-2030 (0.2 percentage points above "World Baseline" levels per annum). The difference between the two alternative cases is about the relation of gas to the oil prices. In both alternative cases oil and coal prices are the same, but gas prices follows different trajectories with lower gas price growth in the medium gas price case than in the soaring oil and gas price scenario (see figure above).

The oil price in 2010 reaches 62 \$/boe in the medium gas and soaring oil prices case, up 15 % from 2005 levels. In 2030 the oil price is further rising to 99 \$/boe (compared to 58 \$/boe in the baseline scenario), which is an increase of more than 70% compared with the baseline. The coal import prices also grow on top of Baseline levels, however at a much slower pace compared to oil. The price for imported coal for the European market reaches 14 \$/boe in 2010 and 20 \$/boe in 2030 exceeding the Baseline level by 32% in 2030.

In the "medium gas and soaring oil prices" case, the price of natural gas in the European market reaches 35 \$/boe in 2010 and 56 \$/boe in 2030 (2% and 25% higher than in the Baseline scenario, respectively). In the "soaring oil and gas prices" case, natural gas prices exhibit an even higher growth over the projection period reaching 37 \$/boe in 2010 (+9% from Baseline levels) and 73 \$/boe in 2030 (+64% from Baseline levels).

In the two sub-cases, except from different import price trajectories, all assumptions (notably energy policies as well as GDP and sectoral production structure) remain unchanged from the Baseline.

Effects of higher fossil fuel prices

The higher prices in the "Medium gas and soaring oil prices" and the "Soaring oil and gas prices" cases lead to significant changes in the evolution of world primary energy supply in comparison to the "World Baseline" scenario. In particular, energy demand is lower than under Baseline developments due to higher energy prices despite higher world economic growth. Consequently, energy intensity improves relative to Baseline - the more so, the higher the gas prices are (soaring oil and gas prices case).

The different import price developments affect above all the fuel structure favouring in particular renewables and nuclear in the long run, but also solid fuels. Coal and lignite are encouraged with strongly growing oil and gas prices. However, in the medium and long term, the competitive advantage that renewables and nuclear gain with high fossil fuel prices (including for coal) becomes more important. Given these changes in the fuel structure, CO₂ emissions would exceed baseline levels in the short term (2010) as high oil and gas prices encourage more coal use. Only in the medium and long term the effects of higher fossil fuel prices on the competitiveness of renewables and nuclear prevail, which leads to world CO₂ emissions that are somewhat below baseline levels. These effects are somewhat more pronounced in case of soaring oil and gas prices. More details including on the world baseline are shown in part 2.2 of this report.

The main purpose of this study is the analysis of the effects of high oil and gas prices on the EU energy system. The EU energy system reacts to higher import prices and the entailed higher energy costs through changes in the fuel mix as well as in terms of improving energy intensity. Primary energy consumption grows less with higher import prices in the two sub-case and the fuel structure changes in favour of renewables, nuclear and solid fuels – however at different degrees according to the scenario.

EU-25: Medium gas and soaring oil price scenario results

In the "medium gas and soaring oil price" case, primary energy demand is about 1% lower than Baseline in 2010 with a slightly higher reduction in 2030 (almost -2%). Energy intensity improves accordingly as GDP of the EU remains unchanged from Baseline in this partial equilibrium modelling.

The most important changes occur in the fuel mix. Oil exhibits the strongest decline from Baseline levels (-4.8% in 2010, -7.9% in 2030). In the long term, demand for both solid fuels and natural gas decline from Baseline levels (-2.5% and -1.5% respectively in 2030). In 2010 and 2020 consumption of natural gas and coal is somewhat higher than in the Baseline as a result of several price induced substitution processes including the replacement of oil with natural gas in household and services as well a more solid fuel use in power generation to the detriment of oil and gas. Higher fossil fuel prices lead to a strong increase in the use of renewable energy forms (+6.0% from Baseline levels in 2020, +9.4% in 2030). Nuclear energy is also projected to become a more competitive option in the long run exceeding Baseline levels by +5.9% in 2030.

The renewables share in gross energy consumption increases somewhat compared with Baseline (+0.2 and +1.4 percentage points in 2010 and 2030 respectively). However, higher fossil fuel prices alone deliver only a limited contribution towards achieving renewables targets, such as the 12% share in gross energy consumption in 2010.

Shares of primary energy sources (in %) in the Medium gas and soaring oil price scenario and changes from Baseline (percentage points)

	2000	2010	2020	2030	Change from Baseline		
					2010	2020	2030
Solid fuels	18.5	16.1	14.4	15.3	+0.2	+0.6	-0.1
Oil	38.4	35.4	33.3	31.7	-1.5	-2.3	-2.1
Gas	22.8	26.4	28.7	27.4	+0.9	+0.6	0.0
Nuclear	14.4	13.8	12.4	12.0	+0.1	+0.2	+0.9
Renewables	5.8	8.2	11.1	13.5	+0.2	+0.8	+1.4

As a result of these changes in the fuel mix and of slightly lower energy intensity, CO2 emissions grow at a slower pace than in the Baseline scenario in the short to medium term (+1.2% from 1990 levels in 2010, +1.3% in 2020). In the long term, CO2 emissions decrease to minus 0.4% from 1990 levels in 2030.

The higher deployment of renewables and nuclear in the long term, in combination with the increasing cost effectiveness of exploiting indigenous fossil fuel resources, leads to a somewhat lower import dependency reaching 61.2% in 2030, which is 3.7 percentage points below Baseline levels.

EU-25: Soaring oil and gas price scenario

The "Soaring oil and gas prices" case has high gas prices in addition to high oil prices close to 100\$ per barrel in 2030. This leads to a small reduction of energy requirements in the EU-25 energy system in comparison to the Baseline scenario (-1.8% in 2030) and a more favourable development for CO2 emissions (reaching +0.8% from 1990 levels in 2030 compared to +4.7% in the Baseline scenario). The import dependency of the EU-25 is also lower than in the Baseline reaching 59.7% in 2030 compared to 64.8% in the Baseline scenario. Similarly, the "Soaring oil and gas prices" case produces somewhat higher renewables shares.

However, in comparison with the “Medium gas and soaring oil price” case, the linking of gas to oil prices exhibits some disadvantages. In addition to the competitiveness disadvantages of higher gas prices for the EU economy, such higher gas prices would also lead to higher CO₂ emission in the long term, as higher gas prices encourage more solid fuel use. Whereas CO₂ emissions fall slightly below the 1990 level in 2030 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil price” case, they stay above the 1990 level in the entire projection period with soaring gas prices, i.e. when gas and oil prices are coupled. It is far from clear whether the slightly higher renewables share in the “Soaring oil and gas price case” in 2030 (14.0% in gross energy consumption instead of 13.5% with medium gas prices) as well as the somewhat lower import dependency (59.7% in 2030 instead of 61.2%) can outweigh these disadvantages.

Scenarios on high oil and gas prices

1.1. Introduction

Energy import prices are one key driver for the development of EU-25 energy demand and supply. In the Baseline scenario² of 2005 the evolution of international fuel prices reflects a conventional wisdom view of the development of the world energy system with relatively abundant oil and gas resources. However, large uncertainties prevail as regards the evolution of international fuel prices, related both on the possible different economic growth patterns for the different world regions as well as on the availability of fossil fuel resources. The price volatility seen in the last few years adds to this uncertainty. Oil and gas prices have continued to increase to levels that hardly anybody would have expected a few years ago.

In that context two alternative scenarios have been examined, addressing different pathways for the evolution of the world energy system and their impact on energy import prices for the EU-25 energy system:

- The “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case, assumes a higher economic growth in parts of Asia (China, India and other Asian developing countries) in combination to relatively less abundant resources than in the Baseline scenario. Furthermore, this case is characterised by the assumption that gas prices are no longer linked with the oil price.
- In the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case, the assumptions as regards economic growth and availability of fossil fuel resources are identical to those of the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case with gas prices remaining linked to the evolution of the oil price.

The projections for the energy import prices assumed in the two alternative scenarios derive from the output of the POLES model,³ as was the case for the Baseline scenario.

The next chapter provides a short description of the three consistent international energy scenarios with contrasted oil and gas price profiles, and an analysis of their consequences on the key variables of the world energy system, on the basis of the POLES model projections. In chapter 3, the impacts of the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case on the future evolution of the EU-25 energy system are discussed in detail. A brief discussion of the impacts of the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case is also provided.

1.2. The World energy outlook under alternative economic development and resources availability assumptions

The work with the POLES model, undertaken by LEPII/EPE-CNRS focused on the examination of world market trends and resulting international fuel price trajectories

² European energy and transport: Trends to 2030 –update 2005 (2006).

³ The POLES model is a global sectoral model of the world energy system. The development of the POLES model has been partially funded under the Joule II and Joule III programmes of DG XII of the European Commission. Since 1997 the model has been fully operational and can produce detailed long-term (2030) world energy and CO₂ emission outlooks with demand, supply and price projections by main region. The model splits the world into 26 regions. For the model design see the model reference manual: *POLES 2.2. European Commission, DG XII, December 1996*.

under different assumptions as regards the availability of fuel resources, as well as issues related to economic growth for the different world regions. The presentation of the international framework puts the analysis for the EU in the global context.

1.2.1. The “World Baseline” scenario

The “World Baseline” scenario corresponds to an energy world developing on the basis of economic fundamentals, without noticeable impacts of climate policies or of geopolitical constraints on world oil development. As illustrated in Table 1.2-1,⁴ world population is assumed to expand at a rate of 0.9% pa in 2001-2030 (from +1.4% pa in 1990-2001) whereas world GDP (expressed in power purchasing standards) grows at a rate of 3.1% pa in 2001-2030. Thus, the average per capita GDP increases from 8324 \$05 in 2001 up to 15814 \$05 in 2030 (+2.2% pa in 2001-2030).

Table 1.2-1: Key assumptions for the “World Baseline” scenario

	1990	2001	2010	2020	2030
Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions					
Population (million)	5248	6112	6800	7510	8100
GDP (000 M\$05-pps)	37105	50880	71713	98593	128095
Per capita GDP (\$05/cap)	7070	8325	10546	13128	15814
Oil and gas reserves (in 000 Mtoe)					
Oil reserves	139.2	160.1	213.8	193.6	176.8
Gas reserves	121.0	146.0	203.8	223.4	228.7
<i>annual growth rate</i>					
	90/01	01/10	10/20	20/30	01/30
Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions					
Population (million)	1.39	1.19	1.00	0.76	0.94
GDP (billion \$05)	2.91	3.89	3.23	2.65	3.13
Per capita GDP (\$05/cap)	1.50	2.66	2.21	1.88	2.16
Oil and gas reserves					
Oil reserves	1.28	3.27	-0.99	-0.90	0.33
Gas reserves	1.72	3.78	0.92	0.24	1.51

Source: POLES.

A key feature of the POLES model is its detailed simulation module for the oil and gas discovery and development process, which is in particular essential to the endogenous process of international oil and gas prices determination.⁵ In broad terms, the logic used in order to model oil and gas supply and price is based on the following sequence:

- The Ultimate Recoverable Resources (URR) is derived from the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimates, but is modified over the projection period in order to account for the impact of increasing recovery rates (which are assumed to be dependent on the oil and gas prices).
- Discoveries depend on the drilling effort (also oil and gas price dependent) and the reserves are equal to the total discoveries minus the past cumulative production.
- For all regions except the Gulf, the production depends on a price dependent “reserve on production” or R/P ratio.

⁴ The POLES model uses 2001 as the base year for the analysis. Thus, in the tables referring to world projections figures for 2001 (instead for 2000; as is the case for the EU-25) are provided.

⁵ World energy prices in the DG Research WETO-H2 project follow a similar approach

- The international prices depends, in the case of oil on the world R/P ratio (including non conventional oil), and for gas on regional R/P ratios as well as of an indexation term to the oil price that can be modified according to the scenario examined.

In this process, the most important exogenous hypothesis is related to the URR estimate at the beginning of the simulation. The uncertainty concerning this set of hypotheses is quite high as testifies the long-lasting controversy between ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ concerning oil and gas resources. In order to produce the “World Baseline” scenario, a relatively optimistic view on oil and gas resource availability has been adopted. In this Baseline scenario world oil reserves will expand significantly between 2001 and 2010 (+33.5%). Beyond 2010, as the world production level exceeds the rate of additional discoveries, world reserves will decline slowly, exceeding nevertheless in 2030 the 2001 level by 10.4%. World gas reserves also exhibit a significant growth between 2001 and 2010 (+39.6%) but slow down thereafter. However, even in the long run that annual production levels remain below additional discoveries and consequently gas reserves exhibit a further increase reaching +56.7% from 2001 levels in 2030.

Table 1.2-2: World Primary Energy Supply in the “World Baseline” scenario

	Mtoe				
	1990	2001	2010	2020	2030
Coal, lignite	2168	2352	3176	3592	4387
Oil	3104	3644	4370	5787	6730
Natural gas	1747	2082	2889	3950	4728
Nuclear energy	509	671	736	833	1132
Renewable energy forms	1104	1341	1537	1642	1765
Hydro & Geothermal	193	232	275	313	346
Biomass & Waste	909	1101	1242	1278	1297
Wind and other renewables	1	7	20	51	122
Total	8631	10090	12708	15804	18742
<i>annual growth rate</i>					
	90/01	01/10	10/20	20/30	01/30
Coal, lignite	0.7	3.4	1.2	2.0	2.1
Oil	1.5	2.0	2.8	1.5	2.1
Natural gas	1.6	3.7	3.2	1.8	2.8
Nuclear energy	2.5	1.0	1.2	3.1	1.8
Renewable energy forms	1.8	1.5	0.7	0.7	0.9
Hydro & Geothermal	1.7	1.9	1.3	1.0	1.3
Biomass & Waste	1.8	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.5
Wind and other renewables	17.6	11.8	9.8	9.1	9.8
Total	1.4	2.6	2.2	1.7	2.1

Source: POLES.

World primary energy supply is projected to grow at a rate of 2.1% pa in 2001-2030 driven by increasing population and economic growth (see Table 1.2-2). In the “World Baseline” scenario the global energy system will become even more dominated by fossil fuels over the next 30 years as dependence on fossil fuels is projected to reach 84.5% in 2030 from 80.1% in 2001. Oil is projected to grow at rates similar to overall primary energy supply and remains the most important source of energy at world level over the projection period (accounting in 2030 for 35.9% of total primary supply from 36.1% in 2001). The most pronounced growth among fossil fuels is projected for natural gas (+2.8% pa in 2001-2030) whereas primary supply of solid fuels grows at rates slightly above average (+2.1% pa). In 2030 natural gas accounts for 25.2% of world primary energy supply (+4.6 percentage points from 2001 levels) becoming the second most important energy form in the world energy system. The share of solid fuels is projected to reach 23.4% in 2030 (from 23.3% in 2001). The nuclear contribution to global primary energy requirements will continue to increase but at a slower pace compared to the recent

past (+1.8% pa in 2001-2030 compared to +2.5% pa in 1990-2001) accounting in 2030 for 6.0% of primary energy supply (-0.7 percentage points from 2001 levels). Biomass use in developing countries that is to a large extent unsustainable is expected to decline with increasing living standards. Globally, biomass-waste utilisation increases only moderately (+0.5% pa in 2001-2030) and in combination with limitations on further hydro expansion the growth of renewable energy forms is limited to just 0.9% pa in 2001-2030. In 2030, renewables account for 9.4% of primary energy supply compared to 13.3% in 2001. Biomass and waste account for 82.2% of renewables supply in 2001 and for 73.5% in 2030. On the contrary a substantial growth is projected for wind and solar energy (+9.8% pa in 2001-2030) leading to an increase of their share in renewables supply by 6.4 percentage points (from 0.5% in 2001 up to 6.9% in 2030).

Energy intensity improvements in the “World Baseline” scenario are projected to reach 1.0% pa in 2001-2030 (see Table 1.2-3), with consumption per capita increasing from 1.65 toe in 2001 to 2.31 toe in 2030 (+1.1% pa in 2001-2030).

Table 1.2-3: Key indicators for the world energy system in the “World Baseline” scenario

	1990	2001	2010	2020	2030
Gross Inland Consumption (Mtoe)	8631	10090	12708	15804	18742
Gross Inl Cons / GDP (toe/M\$05)	233	198	177	160	146
Gross Inland Cons./Capita (kgoe/cap)	1645	1651	1869	2104	2314
CO ₂ Emissions (Mt CO ₂)	20822	23566	30521	38318	45722
CO ₂ Emissions / Capita (t of CO ₂ /capita)	4.0	3.9	4.5	5.1	5.6
Carbon intensity (t of CO ₂ /toe of GIC)	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
<i>annual growth rate</i>					
	90/01	01/10	10/20	20/30	01/30
Gross Inland Consumption (Mtoe)	1.43	2.60	2.20	1.72	2.09
Gross Inl Cons / GDP (toe/M\$05)	-1.44	-1.24	-1.00	-0.91	-1.01
Gross Inland Cons./Capita (kgoe/cap)	0.03	1.39	1.19	0.95	1.13
CO ₂ Emissions (Mt CO ₂)	1.13	2.92	2.30	1.78	2.23
CO ₂ Emissions / Capita (t of CO ₂ /capita)	-0.26	1.70	1.29	1.02	1.28
Carbon intensity (t of CO ₂ /toe of GIC)	-0.29	0.31	0.09	0.06	0.15

Source: POLES.

Given the above Baseline energy developments, global CO₂ emissions will increase by 2.2% pa on average between 2001 and 2030. In 2030, world CO₂ emissions will be more than twice as high as in 1990 (an increase of 120% over the 1990 level). The projected CO₂ emissions growth is even slightly faster than primary energy consumption. The carbon intensity of the world energy system is projected to worsen by 0.15% pa in 2001-2030, as changes in the fuel mix towards the use of fossil fuels are partly counterbalanced by the projected shift towards the use of natural gas and away from coal.

The evolution of primary energy prices in the “World Baseline” scenario, illustrated in Table 1.2-4, reflects a situation in which no strong supply constraints are supposed to be felt at least in the period to 2020. The projected decline of the oil price, from the high levels of 2005 (55 \$05 per boe), in the period to 2010 reflects a modelled development of relatively abundant supply due to competition among key producers. It should be recalled that the modelling considers economic fundamentals but cannot address more short term fluctuations reflecting e.g. enhanced geopolitical instabilities. After that date, when the production of the Gulf and OPEC regions has to expand more rapidly to keep pace with world demand, the oil price increases regularly and attains 58 \$05 per boe in 2030, a level that is higher than the one reached in 2005 under particularly tense supply conditions.

Table 1.2-4: Primary energy prices in the “World Baseline” scenario

	\$05/boe				
	1990	2001	2010	2020	2030
Oil	32.4	35.9	44.6	48.1	57.6
Natural Gas					
American market	18.3	25.2	23.4	36.0	45.4
European and African market	13.1	17.9	33.9	37.0	44.7
Asian market	24.8	26.9	34.2	39.1	42.0
Coal					
American market	15.3	8.3	9.9	12.2	15.3
European and African market	15.4	9.4	12.5	14.1	14.9
Asian market	11.1	8.9	12.1	14.1	16.4
<i>annual growth rate</i>					
	90/01	01/10	10/20	20/30	01/30
Oil	0.9	2.5	0.7	1.8	1.6
Natural Gas					
American market	2.9	-0.8	4.4	2.3	2.0
European and African market	2.9	7.3	0.9	1.9	3.1
Asian market	0.7	2.7	1.4	0.7	1.5
Coal					
American market	-5.4	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.0
European and African market	-4.4	3.2	1.2	0.6	1.6
Asian market	-2.0	3.4	1.6	1.5	2.0

Source: POLES.

These changes reflect the built-in dynamic processes in the model: in the short run, oil prices depend on changes in global oil demand and on the productive capacities of the Gulf countries, considered as the "swing producers" in the oil market. In the longer run, oil prices are likely to be influenced to a greater extent by the "fundamentals", i.e. the relative dynamics of oil demand and of available reserves, which is measured by the variations in the R/P ratio. In the "World Baseline" scenario the R/P ratio is projected to increase from close to 46 years in 2001 up to 49 years in 2010 declining thereafter to reach 26 years in 2030.

While the oil market is fairly integrated at a global level ("one great pool"), this is not the case for gas and coal, the markets of which still show a strong regional basis. The main reason for these regional differentiations is the high transportation cost of gas and coal, relative to their production cost. Although the development of LNG transport facilities will introduce some degree of trade-off between the regional gas markets the price differentials are not expected to fully disappear over the next 30 years under baseline assumptions. In the European and the American market natural gas prices are projected to grow at rates well above those of oil in 2001-2030 (+2.0% pa and +3.1% pa respectively compared to a growth of +1.6% pa for the oil price). In the Asian market the growth reaches +1.5% pa in 2001-2030. Thus, in the "World Baseline" scenario the oil to gas price ratio for the European gas market amounts to 1.3 in 2030 from 2.0 in 2001. Coal prices are projected to grow faster in the American and Asian markets (+2.0 pa in 2001-2030) than in the European and African market (+1.6% pa). In 2030 the coal to oil price ratio for the European market is projected to be 0.26, similar to the ratio in 2001.

1.2.2. The “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” and “World soaring oil and gas prices” scenario


The assumption of abundant resources in the "World Baseline" scenario results in global energy markets that remain well supplied at a relatively modest cost throughout the projection period. This is a plausible setting but, of course, it is not the only one possible. Substantial uncertainties surround both world economic growth and global energy resources.

The “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” and “World soaring oil and gas prices” cases focus on the impacts that faster world economic growth in combination with relatively less abundant resources could have on the evolution of international fuel prices, which in turn affects the world energy outlook.

World GDP grows at a rate of 3.3% pa in 2001-2030 (0.2 percentage points above “World Baseline” levels per annum), leading to a GDP level that exceeds the Baseline case by 1.5%, 3.3% and 4.9% in 2010, 2020 and 2030 respectively. The additional growth occurs in China, India and the other Asian developing countries, whereas for reasons of comparability concerning the effects of different import prices as distinct from economic growth, GDP in the EU remains unchanged from Baseline levels.

Ultimate Recoverable Resources (URR) for oil and natural gas are also assumed to be significantly lower than in the “World Baseline”. The assumed oil URR is -19% lower in 2010 and -14% lower in 2030, whereas that for natural gas is -3.1% lower in 2010 and -13.8% lower in 2030.

Figure 1.2-1: International energy prices for the European energy market under alternative world scenarios



Source: POLES.

The difference between the two alternative cases examined for the world energy outlook concerns the approach retained as regards the evolution of natural gas prices in relation to the oil price. Thus, in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” natural gas prices are assumed to exhibit a strong de-linking from the evolution of the oil price whereas in the “World soaring oil and gas prices” natural gas prices remain linked to the oil price. Thus, while oil and coal prices exhibit the same growth pattern in both cases, the growth on top of “World Baseline” levels for the natural gas prices in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” scenario is significantly less pronounced than in the “World soaring oil and gas prices” case (see Figure 1.2-1).

The oil price in 2010 reaches 61.9\$05 per barrel of oil equivalent (boe), up 14.6% from 2005 levels compared to a decline by -17.4% from 2005 levels projected in the “World Baseline” scenario. In 2030 the oil price is further rising to 98.5\$05 per boe (compared to 57.6\$05 per boe in the “World Baseline” scenario, an increase of more than 70%). The import price of coal is also projected to grow on top of Baseline levels, however at a

much slower pace compared to oil. The price for imported coal for the European market increases by 8.7% from “World Baseline” levels in 2010 (reaching 13.6\$05 per boe compared to 12.5\$05 per boe in the Baseline) and exceeds the Baseline level by 32.1% in 2030 (reaching 19.8\$05 per boe, +3.8\$05 per boe).

In the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case, the price of natural gas in the European market reaches 34.6\$05 per boe in 2010 and 55.9\$05 per boe in 2030 (2.1% and 24.8% higher than in the “World Baseline” scenario, respectively). In the “World soaring oil and gas prices” case, natural gas prices exhibit an even higher growth over the projection period reaching 36.8\$05 per boe in 2010 (+8.8% from “World Baseline” levels, +6.5% from “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case) and 73.3\$05 per boe in 2030 (+64.0% from “World Baseline” levels, +31.3% from “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case).

The higher prices faced by the energy systems in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” and the “World soaring oil and gas prices” cases lead to significant changes in the evolution of world primary energy supply in comparison to the “World Baseline” scenario.

In the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case energy supply is projected to exhibit a slight growth on top of Baseline levels in 2010 (+0.2%) declining below Baseline levels thereafter (-1.7% in 2020, -1.4% in 2030) despite the higher economic growth (see Table 1.2-5). Furthermore, there are significant changes in the fuel mix with supply for oil and natural gas exhibiting a strong decline from Baseline levels (-4.3% and -0.1% respectively in 2010, -14.8% and -5.9% respectively in 2030). This is compensated by higher use of all other energy forms. For solid fuels the growth on top of Baseline levels ranges from +6.2% in 2010 up to +15.5% in 2030. Nuclear energy becomes a more cost effective option for power generation in the long run (+1.7% in 2010, +19.9% in 2030) while the growth on top of Baseline levels for renewable energy forms reaches up to +6.2% in 2030 (+0.8% in 2010).

Table 1.2-5: World Primary Energy Supply in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” scenario

	Mtoe				% change from baseline		
	2001	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Coal, lignite	2352	3372	4144	5066	6.2	15.4	15.5
Oil	3644	4181	5088	5734	-4.3	-12.1	-14.8
Natural gas	2082	2886	3684	4451	-0.1	-6.7	-5.9
Nuclear energy	671	748	916	1357	1.7	10.0	19.9
Renewable energy forms	1341	1550	1707	1875	0.8	4.0	6.2
Hydro & Geothermal	232	275	317	352	0.2	1.3	1.6
Biomass & Waste	1101	1254	1332	1379	1.0	4.2	6.3
Wind and other renewables	7	20	59	145	1.6	15.3	18.9
Total	10090	12737	15540	18483	0.2	-1.7	-1.4

Source: POLES.

The share of fossil fuels in primary energy supply is projected to reach 82.5% in 2030 (-2.0 percentage points from Baseline levels). The share of solid fuels is projected to grow from 2001 levels over the projection period up to 27.4% in 2030 (from 23.4% in the Baseline). Demand for liquid fuels is strongly affected by the prevailing higher prices accounting for 31.0% of primary energy supply in 2030 compared to 35.9% in the Baseline. Despite the higher natural gas prices prevailing in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case, energy demand for natural gas grows at rates above average over the projection period though at a slower pace compared to the Baseline scenario; in 2030 natural gas account for 24.1% of primary energy supply from 25.2% in the Baseline scenario. The higher competitiveness of nuclear energy in the long run is also reflected in its market share which is projected to reach 7.3% in 2030 (+1.3 percentage points higher than in the Baseline). Renewables, account for 10.1% of primary energy needs in 2030 compared to 9.4% in the Baseline. The growth of renewables is mainly driven by the

higher deployment of wind and solar energy (+18.9% from Baseline levels in 2030) but also by high consumption of biomass and waste (+6.3% in 2030).

Table 1.2-6: Key indicators for the world energy system in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” scenario

	2001	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Population (million)	6112	6800	7510	8100	0.0	0.0	0.0
GDP (000 M\$05-pps)	52991	75805	106041	140000	1.5	3.3	4.9
Per capita GDP (\$05/cap)	8669	11148	14119	17284	1.5	3.3	4.9
Gross Inland Consumption (Mtoe)	10090	12737	15540	18483	0.2	-1.7	-1.4
Gross Inl Cons / GDP (toe/M\$05)	190	168	147	132	-1.2	-4.8	-6.0
Gross Inland Cons./Capita (kgoe/cap)	1651	1873	2069	2282	0.2	-1.7	-1.4
CO ₂ Emissions (Mtn CO ₂)	23566	30772	38011	45055	0.8	-0.8	-1.5
CO ₂ Emissions / Capita (t of CO ₂ /capita)	3.9	4.5	5.1	5.6	0.8	-0.8	-1.5
Carbon intensity (t of CO ₂ /toe of GIC)	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	0.6	0.9	-0.1

Source: POLES.

Concluding, the high energy import prices prevailing in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case lead to a significant decrease on top of Baseline levels for energy intensity (-1.2% lower in 2010, -6.0% lower in 2030) achieved through the adoption of more efficient technologies and the more rational use of energy by consumers following higher energy prices (see Table 1.2-6). However, the changes in the fuel mix towards the use of solid fuels more than counterbalance the corresponding growth, on top of Baseline levels, for nuclear energy and renewable energy forms, leading to a worsening of carbon intensity in the short to medium term. It is only in the long run that carbon intensity is projected to be similar to the Baseline as a result of the strong deployment of nuclear energy on top of Baseline levels. In 2010, global CO₂ emissions are projected to be 0.8% higher than in the Baseline scenario, whereas in 2030 they decline by -1.5% from Baseline levels.

Table 1.2-7: Key indicators for the world energy system in the “Soaring oil and gas prices” scenario

	2001	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Population (million)	6112	6800	7510	8100	0.0	0.0	0.0
GDP (000 M\$05-pps)	52991	75805	106041	140000	1.5	3.3	4.9
Per capita GDP (\$05/cap)	8669	11148	14119	17284	1.5	3.3	4.9
Gross Inland Consumption (Mtoe)	10090	12729	15441	18259	0.2	-2.3	-2.6
Gross Inl Cons / GDP (toe/M\$05)	190	168	146	130	-1.3	-5.4	-7.2
Gross Inland Cons./Capita (kgoe/cap)	1651	1872	2056	2254	0.2	-2.3	-2.6
CO ₂ Emissions (Mtn CO ₂)	23566	30784	37966	44814	0.9	-0.9	-2.0
CO ₂ Emissions / Capita (t of CO ₂ /capita)	3.9	4.5	5.1	5.5	0.9	-0.9	-2.0
Carbon intensity (t of CO ₂ /toe of GIC)	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	0.7	1.4	0.6

Source: POLES.

In the “World Soaring oil and gas prices”, the particular strong growth of natural gas prices (even higher than in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case) leads to further changes both as regards overall energy requirements as well as in the fuel mix. As can be seen in Table 1.2-7 consumers faced with even higher energy prices react also through further improvements in terms of energy intensity (down as much as -7.2% from Baseline levels in 2030).

In the “World Soaring oil and gas prices” case, solid fuels grow faster than total energy supply, so that the solid fuel share reaches 28.9% of primary energy supply in 2030. Moreover, solids increase their contribution more than under medium gas price conditions. Nuclear energy (7.9% in 2030) and renewables (10.4% in 2030) also grow faster than in the Baseline and in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case. In

addition, energy supply of liquid fuels declines at a slower pace from Baseline levels (-11.8% in 2030 compared to -14.8% in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case). In 2030 oil is projected to account for 32.5% of world primary energy supply. On the contrary, supply for natural gas declines substantially (-21.4% from Baseline levels in 2030 compared to -5.9% in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case) accounting for 20.3% of primary energy supply in 2030 (-4.9 percentage points in comparison to the Baseline, -3.7 percentage points in comparison to the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case).

The projected changes in the fuel mix lead to a worsening of carbon intensity (+0.7% from Baseline levels in 2010, +0.6% in 2030). However, global CO₂ emissions are projected to increase from Baseline levels only in 2010 (+0.9%). In 2020 and 2030 global CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by -0.9% and -2.0% from Baseline levels as lower energy requirements (-2.3% in 2020 and -2.6% in 2030) more than counterbalance the projected worsening of carbon intensity.

1.3. The “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

1.3.1. Modelling approach

The “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case explores the possible evolution of the EU-25 energy system in the presence of much higher energy import prices (as derived by the POLES model in the “World medium gas and soaring oil prices” case) compared to the Baseline scenario.

All remaining assumptions (demographic, macroeconomic and policy ones) remain unchanged from Baseline levels. It is assumed that economic agents successfully anticipate the changes in prices so that the energy using capital stock over the projection period is the one that agents planned in advance; and they do not find themselves in a situation where they have to scrap or retrofit equipment that would prove uneconomic in the price environment assumed under each scenario.

1.3.2. “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” scenario results for EU-25⁶

1.3.2.1. Overview of main results

In the presence of higher energy import prices, leading to higher energy costs both on the demand and the supply sides, the energy system reacts through changes in the fuel mix as well as in terms of improving energy intensity. Table 1.3-1 illustrates the projected evolution of EU-25 primary energy needs under the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case assumptions. A slowdown of primary energy growth in the EU-25 energy system compared to the Baseline scenario is projected to occur, but this is rather limited over the projection period (reaching up to -1.7% from Baseline levels in 2030).

⁶ Aggregate results by group of countries (EU-25, EU-15, NMS, EU-27, EU28 and Europe-30) can be found in Appendix 1.

Table 1.3-1: Primary Energy Demand in EU-25 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

	Mtoe				% change from baseline		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Solid Fuels	306.5	288.7	267.5	285.8	0.7	3.1	-2.5
Liquid Fuels	634.7	636.4	618.4	590.0	-4.8	-7.7	-7.9
Natural Gas	376.3	473.6	533.2	510.1	2.5	0.7	-1.5
Nuclear	237.7	248.8	229.7	223.3	0.0	0.5	5.9
Renewable En. Sources	96.5	146.6	207.1	252.5	2.0	6.0	9.4
Total	1653.8	1796.3	1858.0	1864.0	-0.9	-1.5	-1.7
EU-15	1456.9	1573.2	1600.5	1581.3	-0.9	-1.4	-1.7
NMS	196.9	223.1	257.5	282.6	-1.1	-1.5	-1.4
Mt CO₂ emitted	3674.1	3822.8	3824.7	3761.3	-1.5	-2.6	-4.9
EU-15	3127.0	3239.9	3212.6	3146.2	-1.5	-2.7	-5.0
NMS	547.1	582.9	612.1	615.1	-1.4	-2.5	-4.5

Source: PRIMES.

The most important changes in the primary energy balance occur in the fuel mix. Demand for liquid fuels exhibits the strongest decline from Baseline levels (-4.8% in 2010, -7.9% in 2030). In 2010 primary energy demand for all other energy forms is projected to grow on top of Baseline levels with natural gas consumption increasing the most (+2.5% from Baseline levels) followed by renewable energy forms and solid fuels (+2.0% and +0.7% from Baseline levels in 2010, respectively), whereas demand for nuclear energy remains unchanged from Baseline levels. This rather surprising result for natural gas is explained by the fact that in 2010 the growth of natural gas prices on top of Baseline levels is less pronounced than that of oil and coal prices, and, thus, in relative terms, the use of natural gas becomes a more cost effective option than in the Baseline scenario (in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case the oil to gas price ratio in 2010 reaches 1.79 from 1.32 in the Baseline scenario and the coal to gas price ratio 0.39 from 0.37 in the Baseline). On the other hand, the less pronounced growth in the use of renewables compared with gas indicates that the impact of the growth on top of Baseline levels for natural gas prices is less pronounced than the additional costs involved for the further exploitation of renewable options in the absence of additional supporting policies for renewables.

This is not the case beyond 2010 as the further growth of fossil fuel prices leads to a strong increase in the use of renewable energy forms (+6.0% from Baseline levels in 2020, +9.4% in 2030). Nuclear energy is also projected to become a more competitive option in the long run reaching at +5.9% from Baseline levels in 2030. It is only then that both demand for solid fuels and natural gas decline from Baseline levels (-2.5% and -1.5% respectively in 2030) following a growth on top of Baseline levels in 2020 (+3.1% and +0.7% respectively).

Changes in the fuel mix result in an increasing contribution of carbon free energy forms in the EU-25 energy system. Their share reaches 22.0% in 2010 (+0.3 percentage points from Baseline levels) further rising to 25.5% in 2030 (+2.2 percentage points from Baseline levels). Renewable energy forms account for 8.2% of primary energy needs in 2010 and 13.5% in 2030 (+0.2 and +1.4 percentage points, respectively, from Baseline levels). High fossil fuel prices facilitate the penetration of renewables, but their contribution towards achieving renewables targets, such as the 12% share in gross energy consumption for 2010, remains rather small.

The shares of natural gas and solid fuels are also projected to exhibit a growth on top of Baseline levels in the short term (+0.9 and +0.2 percentage points respectively in 2010) and reach similar to the Baseline levels in the long run (+0.0 and -0.1 percentage points respectively in 2030). Liquid fuels are projected to continuously lose market share accounting for 35.4% of primary energy needs in 2010 and 31.7% in 2030 (from 36.9% in 2010 and 33.8% in 2030 under Baseline assumptions).

As a result of these changes in the fuel mix, the carbon intensity of the EU-25 energy system improves by 0.6% from Baseline levels in 2010, by 1.2% in 2020 and 3.3% in 2030. This, in combination to the projected energy intensity gains (equivalent to the decline in primary energy needs as economic growth in the EU-25 is assumed to remain unaffected by rising energy import prices) leads to a decline of CO₂ emissions which are projected to reach -1.5% from Baseline levels in 2010 and -4.9% in 2030. In comparison to 1990 levels, CO₂ emissions are projected to increase by +1.2% in 2010 and +1.3% in 2020, declining thereafter to reach -0.4% from 1990 levels in 2030.

Table 1.3-2: Import dependency in EU-25 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

	%				percentage points difference from baseline		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Solid fuels	30.8	46.3	48.7	57.8	0.1	-0.8	-1.2
Liquid fuels	76.4	80.4	88.5	90.5	-3.3	-4.2	-3.2
Natural gas	49.6	62.5	80.9	83.0	-0.3	-0.6	-1.5
Total	47.2	53.2	60.5	61.2	-1.8	-3.0	-3.7
EU-15	49.5	54.6	62.2	63.0	-2.0	-3.2	-3.8
NMS	30.1	43.2	50.0	50.8	-0.9	-2.0	-2.9

Source: PRIMES.

Import dependency in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case is projected to exhibit a significant decrease from Baseline levels (see Table 1.3-2) being limited to 53.2% in 2010 (from 55.0% in the Baseline scenario) and 61.2% in 2030 (-3.7 percentage points from Baseline levels). Changes in the fuel mix in combination to the higher exploitation of indigenous fossil fuel resources (becoming a more cost effective option in the presence of higher energy import prices) are the key drivers for this improvement.

1.3.2.2. Final energy demand

Higher energy import prices lead to a decline of energy requirements in the demand side, ranging from -0.9% from Baseline levels in 2010 up to -2.1% in 2030 (see Table 1.3-3). In the long run this decline is higher than the corresponding decline in primary energy needs reflecting the structural and behavioural changes that take place in an environment of high prices but also the changes in the fuel mix and the adoption of more efficient equipment occurring in the demand side.

Table 1.3-3: Final Energy Demand and CO₂ emission by Sector in EU-25 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

	Mtoe				% change from baseline		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Industry	330.1	355.4	379.8	387.2	-0.3	-0.7	-1.1
Residential	273.3	309.2	332.7	342.6	-0.9	-1.8	-2.5
Tertiary	159.0	186.6	207.7	219.2	-1.0	-2.0	-2.7
Transports	333.0	375.7	396.1	392.5	-1.4	-2.3	-2.4
Total	1095.4	1226.9	1316.2	1341.5	-0.9	-1.7	-2.1
EU-15	970.7	1077.0	1135.7	1139.4	-0.9	-1.7	-2.1
NMS	124.7	150.0	180.5	202.1	-0.9	-1.6	-2.2
Mt CO ₂ emissions				% change from baseline			
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
	567.7	565.7	577.4	544.2	-2.0	-3.0	-4.5
Industry	452.1	470.2	471.7	455.3	-2.6	-4.7	-6.5
Residential	244.6	255.4	263.8	264.1	-2.4	-4.4	-6.3
Tertiary	969.9	1057.1	1075.0	1041.6	-1.6	-3.6	-4.7
Total	2234.3	2348.4	2387.9	2305.3	-2.0	-3.8	-5.2
EU-15	1985.3	2071.8	2079.9	1982.0	-2.0	-3.8	-5.1
NMS	249.0	276.6	308.1	323.2	-1.8	-3.6	-5.6

Source: PRIMES.


Industry exhibits only a small reaction to price increases whereas the tertiary, residential and transport sectors are more responsive to price changes.

Because of the relatively low taxation of energy products for industrial uses, one would expect that this sector would be the most responsive to the price shock as it experiences the sharpest increase in energy prices. However, this sector is also characterised by limited flexibility regarding both short-term structural change and further substitution among fuels above that projected in the Baseline projections. As a result energy use in industry exhibits only a limited decline from Baseline levels over the projection period. However, the sector undergoes some additional changes in the fuel mix towards the use of natural gas, electricity and co-generated steam as well as biomass and waste in industrial boilers, occurring to the detriment of liquid fuels. These shifts result in CO₂ emissions reduction well above the corresponding decline in energy requirements, -2.0% from Baseline levels in 2010 and -4.5% in 2030.

The tertiary and residential sectors are projected to be the most responsive to higher energy import prices in the long run. Besides energy intensity gains achieved through the adoption of more efficient technologies, higher fuel prices lead to a slowdown in the pace with which the energy consumers shift towards higher comfort standards. As a result energy demand in the tertiary sector falls by 2.7% from Baseline levels in 2030 with the corresponding decrease in residential energy demand reaching 2.5%. Furthermore, both sectors undergo significant changes in the fuel mix which in turn result in even more pronounced CO₂ emission reductions in 2030 (-6.3% from Baseline levels in the tertiary sector, -6.5% in the residential sector).

Energy consumers in the transport sector also respond to higher oil prices mainly through lowering their transport activity and shifts towards less energy intensive transport modes. These changes take place despite the fact that the high taxes on transport fuels greatly dampen the impact of further changes in international fuel prices. As a result energy demand in the transport sector in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case is projected to be -1.4% lower from Baseline levels in 2010 and -2.4% lower in 2030. Furthermore, higher oil prices lead to some acceleration in the share of biofuels in gasoline and diesel consumption. The share of biofuels is projected to reach 4.1% in 2010 (compared to 3.9% under Baseline assumptions), 8.3% in 2020 (6.9% in Baseline) and 10.7% in 2030 (8.3% in Baseline). The accelerated penetration of biofuels in transport impacts on the evolution of CO₂ emissions in the sector, which are projected to decrease at rates well above those of energy demand over the projection period (reaching -4.7% from Baseline levels in 2030).

Figure 1.3-1: Changes in final energy demand by fuel in EU-25 (diff. from Baseline in Mtoe) in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case



Source: PRIMES.

In terms of fuel use, the most pronounced changes, from Baseline levels, in the demand side occur for liquid fuels, natural gas and biomass and waste (see Figure 1.3-1). Demand for liquid fuels declines at rates well above those for total energy requirements in the demand side both in absolute terms (-22.0 Mtoe for oil compared to -11.1 Mtoe for total final energy in 2010, -40.8 Mtoe compared to -28.9 Mtoe in 2030) and in percentage terms (-4.2% and -8.0% for liquid fuels in 2010 and 2030 respectively, compared to -0.9% and -2.1% for total final energy demand). Taking into account the increase in the share of biofuels in gasoline and diesel oil used in the transport sector, the impact on mineral oil becomes even more pronounced reaching up to -10% from Baseline levels in 2030.

The use of all other energy forms in the demand side is projected to grow on top of Baseline levels over the projection period, with the only exception concerning demand for solid fuels in 2030 (-2.8% from Baseline levels). The most pronounced growth in absolute terms in 2010 and 2020 is projected for natural gas demand (+2.7% and +2.2% from Baseline levels, respectively), a result explained by the fact that, under the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case assumptions for international fuel prices, natural gas becomes a more cost effective option both against oil and coal. This is also the case for 2030, however, as natural gas prices further grow on top of Baseline levels the demand side shifts towards the use of other energy forms limiting the additional contribution of natural gas in satisfying final energy requirements to just +0.5 Mtoe (or +0.1% from Baseline levels). Biomass and waste continuously grow on top of Baseline levels (+4.2% in 2010; +14.7% in 2030) whereas solar energy also makes some significant inroads (+4.5% from Baseline levels in 2010; +29.6% in 2030). Demand for electricity and distributed steam exhibits only a limited growth from Baseline levels (+0.1% and +0.4% respectively in 2010; +0.1% and +1.1% respectively in 2030) despite the fact that structural changes in power generation lead to a partial absorption of additional costs imposed on the energy system as a result of higher fuel prices and, consequently, a less pronounced increase in the price of electricity than that for oil and gas. Therefore, the shares for both electricity and distributed steam in final energy


demand increase from Baseline levels, which is also due to the decline of final energy requirements from Baseline levels.

In 2030, electricity accounts for 24.9% of energy requirements in the demand side (+0.5 percentage points from Baseline levels), and distributed steam for 7.2% from 7.0% in the Baseline scenario. The share of natural gas also exhibits a limited growth from Baseline levels in the long run (reaching 24.0% in 2030 from 23.5% in the Baseline scenario). The most pronounced increase is projected for the market share of biomass and waste (accounting for 5.8% of energy requirements in the demand side in 2030, +0.8 percentage points from Baseline levels). As already discussed, these changes take place to the detriment of liquid fuels, the share of which declines by 2.2 percentage points from Baseline levels down to 35.1% in 2030.

1.3.2.3. Electricity and steam generation

Higher energy import prices have only a limited impact on overall electricity generation (less than 0.1% higher from Baseline levels in 2010 and 2020, less than 0.1% lower in 2030). However, the different international prices profiles lead to substantial changes in producers' investment decisions as regards the expansion and/or replacement of existing power generation capacity.

Figure 1.3-2: Changes in electricity generation by energy form in EU-25 (diff. from Baseline in TWh) in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case



Source: PRIMES.

As can be seen in Figure 1.3-2, only limited changes are projected to occur in electricity generation in 2010. The gap due to additional electricity generation (+2 TWh from Baseline levels) and the decline in generation using liquid fuels (-2 TWh or -1.2% from Baseline levels), natural gas (-2 TWh or -0.3%) and biomass/waste (-1 TWh or -1.4%) is closed by increased generation from solid fuels (+2 TWh or +2.2%) and other renewable energy forms (+4 TWh or +2.2% for wind energy, +1 TWh or +0.2% for hydro).

The impact of high energy import prices on the structure of electricity and steam generation becomes more pronounced in the long run. In 2020, electricity generation from natural gas declines by -6.5% from Baseline levels, with the corresponding decline in 2030 reaching -9.5%. The gap in 2020 is partly covered by solid fuels, (+3.7% higher

electricity generation from Baseline levels), involving a higher exploitation of indigenous coal and lignite resources. Power generation from renewables grow significantly from Baseline levels in 2020 (+4.2% in total, +7.8% for wind energy and +6.0% for biomass/waste), whereas the growth in electricity generation from nuclear power plants is limited to 0.5% from Baseline levels in 2020. In 2030, the cost effectiveness advantage of nuclear energy due to higher fossil fuel costs in power generation becomes more pronounced with electricity generation from nuclear increasing by 5.9% from Baseline levels. Renewable energy options are also more deployed in a high fossil fuel price environment (+5.7% from Baseline levels for total electricity from renewables, +10.0% for wind energy, +7.0% for biomass/waste). On the contrary, the increasing cost effectiveness of nuclear has a negative effect on electricity generation from solid fuels, which is projected to produce -1.7% less electricity compared to the Baseline in 2030.

The changes in the sector lead to an increased share of renewable energy forms (including waste) in electricity generation, especially in the long run. The renewables share reaches 18.2% in 2010 (+0.1 percentage points above Baseline levels) and rises further to 29.2% in 2030 (compared to 27.6% in the Baseline scenario). Nuclear energy accounts for 19.8% of electricity generation in 2030 (+1.1 percentage points above Baseline levels). Thus, the market share of electricity generation from fossil fuels in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case declines by -0.1 percentage points below Baseline levels in 2010 and -2.7 percentage points in 2030. The most pronounced impact is projected for natural gas (share declining by -0.1 percentage points from Baseline levels in 2010 and -2.2 percentage points in 2030), with the corresponding decline for solids reaching -0.5 percentage points in 2030 (from an increase of +0.8 percentage points compared to Baseline levels in 2020).

Table 1.3-4: Installed capacity by plant type in EU-25 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

	GW installed				change from baseline (in GW)		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	141.1	136.4	117.5	107.5	0.0	0.5	6.3
<u>Renewable energy (excl. biomass-waste)</u>	110.1	185.9	251.4	330.4	1.7	9.9	24.4
Hydro (pumping excluded)	97.2	104.0	108.8	112.7	0.1	0.1	0.5
Lakes	52.2	56.1	58.0	59.0	0.1	0.1	0.4
Run of river	45.0	47.9	50.8	53.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wind power	12.8	80.0	137.4	206.9	1.6	9.7	24.0
Wind on-shore	12.8	70.5	111.5	158.5	0.4	2.6	19.8
Wind off-shore	0.0	9.5	25.8	48.4	1.2	7.2	4.2
Solar	0.2	1.7	4.8	10.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other renewables (tidal etc.)	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Thermal power</u>	410.5	494.7	588.0	688.1	4.6	3.5	-1.5
Solids fired	188.9	158.0	163.5	213.3	1.4	6.7	2.1
Oil fired	74.3	69.1	50.2	36.2	3.0	2.3	1.3
Gas fired	131.9	245.2	313.6	349.3	-0.2	-7.6	-10.8
Natural gas	119.2	233.4	304.1	341.0	-0.2	-7.6	-11.0
Derived gasses	12.7	11.8	9.5	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.2
Biomass-waste fired	14.5	21.1	59.2	87.5	0.4	2.1	5.9
Fuel cells	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Geothermal heat	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	661.7	817.1	956.9	1125.9	6.3	13.9	29.2
EU-15	588.1	730.0	840.1	958.4	5.6	11.6	28.4
NMS	73.7	87.1	116.8	167.5	0.8	2.3	0.8
of which CHP	113.0	154.9	212.7	249.1	4.0	3.7	1.1
EU-15	88.5	128.0	179.0	195.8	3.3	3.5	1.8
NMS	24.4	26.9	33.7	53.2	0.7	0.2	-0.7

Source: PRIMES.

The above changes are also reflected in the investment decisions of power generators, which are clearly altered by these different fuel prices. More specifically, given higher

gas prices, gas fired power plants lose much of their cost effectiveness, and are mainly replaced by renewable technologies (see Table 1.3-4). The higher deployment of renewables capacity and especially wind turbines (involving lower utilisation rates compared with e.g. natural gas power plants) leads to an increase of total installed capacity up to 1126 GW in 2030 (+29.2 GW or +2.7% from Baseline levels) compared to a rather stable electricity production. Renewables capacity (including biomass-waste and geothermal power plants) is projected to reach 420 GW in 2030 accounting for 37.3% of total installed capacity (from 35.5% in the Baseline scenario). Nuclear capacity is also projected to grow on top of Baseline levels in the long run (+6.3 GW or +6.2% from Baseline levels in 2030) accounting for 9.5% of total installed capacity in 2030 from 9.2% in the Baseline. On the contrary, natural gas fired power plants capacity is projected to grow at a slower pace than in the Baseline scenario to reach 341 GW in 2030 (-11.0 GW or -3.1% from Baseline levels).

The stronger penetration of renewable energy forms in the power generation sector partly counterbalances the slower deployment of gas fired power plants with overall power generation efficiency reaching rates slightly below those projected in the Baseline scenario (48.5% compared to 48.6% in 2030). As regards thermal power plants efficiency it is projected to reach 47.3% in 2030 compared to 47.5% in the Baseline scenario. Total fuel input in power generation exhibits a limited decline from Baseline levels ranging from -0.3% in 2010 to -0.4% in 2030 (see Table 1.3-5).

Table 1.3-5: Fuel input in the EU-25 power generation sector in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case

	Mtoe				% change from baseline		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Solids	214.5	216.5	206.5	236.0	0.7	4.0	-1.8
Oil products	41.9	30.0	22.2	19.7	-5.2	-4.9	-0.5
Gas	105.5	151.5	171.7	140.7	-0.9	-6.0	-9.4
Biomass-waste	21.2	28.6	56.0	73.2	-1.8	4.4	5.5
Nuclear energy	237.7	248.8	229.7	223.3	0.0	0.5	5.9
Geothermal heat	2.9	3.7	4.7	5.3	0.0	1.4	1.6
Total	623.7	679.1	690.7	698.3	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4
EU15	542.2	585.9	583.6	579.4	-0.3	-0.1	-0.6
NMS	81.5	93.2	107.1	118.9	-0.3	0.1	1.0
Mt CO₂ emitted	1250.0	1325.8	1306.9	1341.1	-0.2	0.2	-3.7
EU-15	997.8	1054.1	1032.6	1075.9	-0.1	0.4	-4.3
NMS	252.2	271.7	274.2	265.1	-0.3	-0.2	-1.0

Source: PRIMES.

Transformation input of solids is higher than in the Baseline up to 2020, exhibiting a decline from Baseline levels thereafter. The growth in gas fuels for power generation exhibits a significant slowdown over the projection period, with consumption of natural gas decreasing -9.4% from Baseline levels in 2030. Biomass and waste are projected to be exploited at fairly high rates beyond 2010 with considerable increases over the corresponding Baseline levels (up to +5.5% in 2030). Nuclear fuel also grows on top of Baseline levels in the long run reaching +5.9% in 2030.


1.3.2.4. CO₂ emissions and concluding remarks

In the short term, the shift towards carbon free energy forms for power generation more than counterbalances the increase in electricity and steam demand and the higher utilisation of solid fuels resulting in lower CO₂ emissions from Baseline levels (-0.2% in 2010). However, in 2020 and as the changes in the fuel mix towards greater use of solid fuels and less natural gas become increasingly important, CO₂ emissions are projected to reach levels slightly above those in the Baseline (+0.2% in 2020 in EU-25). In 2030, lower electricity requirements in combination to the higher exploitation of nuclear energy and the decline in the use of solid fuels lead to a decline of CO₂ emissions by -3.7% compared to the Baseline scenario with carbon intensity improvements reaching 4.2%

from Baseline levels (compared to a 0.4% improvement in 2010 and unchanged carbon intensity in 2020).

In the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case total CO₂ emissions are projected to grow at a slower pace than in the Baseline scenario. In 2010 they are 1.2% higher than they had been in 1990 (compared to 2.8% higher in the Baseline) while in 2030 they are projected to fall slightly below the 1990 levels (minus 0.4% compared to an increase by +4.7% from 1990 levels in the Baseline scenario). As illustrated in Figure 1.3-3, the demand side (both because of changes in the fuel mix and efficiency gains) is the main driver for the projected reduction of CO₂ emissions in comparison to the Baseline; whereas the supply side contribution becomes increasingly important only in the long run. In 2010 the demand side accounts for 81% of total CO₂ emissions reduction achieved from Baseline levels, a share increasing to 90% in 2020, but dropping thereafter to 65% by 2030.

Figure 1.3-3: Changes in CO₂ emissions in EU-25 (diff. from Baseline in Mt CO₂) in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case



Source: PRIMES.

Concluding, an environment of high energy prices, as examined in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case, exerts only a small downward pressure on energy requirements for the EU-25 energy system with more pronounced shifts occurring in the fuel mix, mainly towards the higher exploitation of renewable energy options. The renewables share in gross energy consumption increases somewhat compared with Baseline (+0.2 and +1.4 percentage points in 2010 and 2030 respectively). However, higher fossil fuel prices alone deliver only a limited contribution towards achieving renewables targets, such as the 12% share in gross energy consumption in 2010.

As a result of these changes in the fuel mix CO₂ emissions grow at a slower pace than in the Baseline scenario in the short to medium term (+1.2% from 1990 levels in 2010, +1.3% in 2020), declining thereafter to reach at -0.4% from 1990 levels in 2030. Finally, the higher deployment of renewables and nuclear in the long run, in combination to the increasing cost effectiveness of exploiting indigenous fossil fuel resources, leads to an improvement of import dependency for the EU-25 energy system, which is projected to reach 61.2% in 2030(3.7 percentage points below Baseline levels).

1.4. “Soaring oil and gas prices” scenario results for EU-25⁷

The “Soaring oil and gas prices” case explores the possible evolution of the EU-25 energy system in the horizon to 2030 in an environment of particularly high energy import prices for oil and gas with gas prices following those of oil. Gas prices in this scenario exceed the gas prices in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case by +6.5% in 2010 and by +31.5% in 2030.

Table 1.4-1: Evolution of primary energy needs in the EU-25 energy system in the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case

	Mtoe				% change from baseline		
	2000	2010	2020	2030	2010	2020	2030
Solid Fuels	306.5	288.7	301.5	326.4	0.7	16.2	11.4
Liquid Fuels	634.7	639.8	628.2	598.2	-4.3	-6.2	-6.6
Natural Gas	376.3	467.4	482.2	449.2	1.1	-9.0	-13.3
Nuclear	237.7	248.8	230.2	224.6	0.0	0.7	6.5
Renewable En. Sources	96.5	147.3	211.7	259.7	2.5	8.3	12.5
Total	1653.8	1794.2	1855.9	1860.3	-1.0	-1.6	-1.8
EU-15	1456.9	1571.8	1599.9	1578.8	-1.0	-1.5	-1.8
NMS	196.9	222.4	256.0	281.5	-1.4	-2.1	-1.8
Mt CO₂ emitted	3674.1	3818.9	3870.2	3804.6	-1.6	-1.5	-3.8
EU-15	3127.0	3237.6	3257.2	3184.3	-1.6	-1.3	-3.8
NMS	547.1	581.4	613.0	620.2	-1.6	-2.3	-3.7

Source: PRIMES.

As was the case in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case overall primary energy needs in the EU-25 energy system exhibit only a limited decline from Baseline levels, -1.0% in 2010, -1.8% in 2030 (see Table 1.4-1). However, changes in the fuel mix follow a different pattern with demand for solid fuels growing well above Baseline levels beyond 2010 (+16.2% in 2020, +11.4% in 2030) while natural gas demand is faced with strong downward pressures in the same period (-9.0% in 2020, -13.3% in 2030). Because of the stronger increase of natural gas prices the impact of high oil prices becomes less pronounced with oil requirements declining by up to -6.6% from Baseline levels in 2030 compared to -7.9% in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case. Nuclear energy is projected to increase slightly more than in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case reaching +6.5% from Baseline levels in 2030 (compared to +5.9% in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case), while the increase in primary energy requirements for renewable energy forms reaches up to +12.5% from Baseline levels in 2030 (compared to an increase by +9.4% in the “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case) with more than 70% of incremental renewable energy requirements being satisfied by biomass/waste in 2030.

The projected growth on top of Baseline levels for renewable energy forms and nuclear energy more than counterbalances the corresponding increase in solid fuels demand occurring to the detriment of liquid fuels and natural gas with carbon intensity declining by 0.6% from Baseline levels in 2010 and by 2.0% in 2030. Thus, CO₂ emissions in the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case are projected to decrease from Baseline levels by -1.6% and -3.8% in 2010 and 2030 respectively. It is only in 2020 that the substantial growth on top of Baseline levels for solid fuels demand results in a slight deterioration of carbon intensity in comparison to the Baseline scenario with CO₂ emissions declining nevertheless by -1.5% from Baseline levels compared to a decline of primary energy requirements by -1.6%.

⁷ Aggregate results by group of countries (EU-25, EU-15, NMS, EU-27, EU28 and Europe-30) can be found in Appendix 2.

In the demand side, energy requirements fall by -1.0% from Baseline levels in 2010, reaching -2.9% in 2030. Demand for liquid fuels declines over the projection period (-4.0% in 2010, -5.9% in 2020 and -6.9% from Baseline levels in 2030) whereas natural gas consumption in the demand side exhibits a limited growth on top of Baseline levels in 2010 (+1.2%), declining thereafter (-3.8% in 2020 and -6.8% in 2030). Renewables are projected to grow well on top of Baseline levels (+5.2% in 2010 up to +17.5% in 2030) while energy demand for electricity, distributed steam and solid fuels is also projected to be somewhat higher than in the Baseline scenario. Furthermore, the share of biofuels in gasoline and diesel demand increases significantly from Baseline levels to reach 4.1% in 2010 and 10.7% in 2030 (+0.2 and +2.5 percentage points respectively from Baseline levels). As a combined effect of the above changes CO₂ emissions in the demand side are projected to decline from Baseline levels by -2.2% in 2010 and by -6.3% in 2030. The most pronounced carbon intensity improvement from Baseline levels is projected for the residential and the tertiary sector (5.8% and 4.6% respectively from Baseline levels in 2030). Carbon intensity improvements in industry reach +3.9% from Baseline levels in 2030, while in the transport sector they amount to +2.3%.

In power generation, prevailing high gas prices strongly affect the cost effectiveness of gas fired power plants with electricity generation from natural gas declining -30.3% from Baseline levels in 2030 (-22.0% in 2020). With overall electricity requirements remaining similar to those of the Baseline scenario, falling power generation from gas is compensated by higher electricity generation from solid fuels (+21.7% from Baseline levels in 2020, +13.2% in 2030), from renewables (+6.5% in 2020, +9.7% in 2030) and nuclear energy (+0.7% in 2020, +6.5% in 2030).

Among the renewable energy forms the most pronounced growth above Baseline levels in relative terms is projected for solar energy, exceeding Baseline levels in 2030 by 310% in power generation. Additional electricity production from solar energy accounts for 22.7% of the incremental renewable electricity in 2030 with wind energy accounting for 44.5% and electricity produced from biomass and waste for 32.6%.

The renewables share in electricity generation increases to 30.1% in 2030 (+2.5 percentage points from Baseline levels) while the share of nuclear energy is projected to reach 19.8% in 2030 (compared to 18.7% in the Baseline). With the share of fossil fuels in total electricity generation being limited to 50.0% in 2030 (from 53.7% in the Baseline scenario), solid fuels are projected to increase their share up to 31% in 2030 (+3.5 percentage points compared to the Baseline) whereas electricity generation in gas fired power plants is limited to 16.1% of total production in 2030 (from 23.2% in the Baseline), a result clearly reflecting the strong impact that the high natural gas prices of the “Soaring oil and gas prices” cases would have on the cost effectiveness of this type of power plants. CO₂ emissions in the power generation sector decline by -0.3% from Baseline levels in 2010, increasing thereafter by +5.1% in 2020 and +0.9% in 2030 as the higher exploitation of renewable energy forms and nuclear energy (in 2030) is not sufficient to counterbalance the increased use of solid fuels.

Thus, the projected CO₂ emissions reduction from Baseline levels in the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case arises mainly from energy intensity improvements and changes in the fuel mix occurring in the demand side (accounting for 82% of total CO₂ emissions reduction in 2010 and 101% in 2030) whereas the supply side has a negative contribution to CO₂ emissions reduction beyond 2010, i.e. changes in power generation put some upward pressure on CO₂ emissions..

Concluding, the high import energy prices assumed in the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case lead to a limited reduction of energy requirements in the EU-25 energy system in comparison to the Baseline scenario and a more favourable development for CO₂ emissions (reaching +0.8% from 1990 levels in 2030 compared to +4.7% in the Baseline scenario). The import dependency of the EU-25 energy system also improves reaching

59.7% in 2030 compared to 64.8% in the Baseline scenario. Similarly, the “Soaring oil and gas prices” case produces somewhat higher renewables shares.

However, in comparison with the “Medium gas and soaring oil price” case, the linking of gas to oil prices exhibits some disadvantages. In addition to the competitiveness disadvantages of higher gas prices for the EU economy, such higher gas prices would also lead to higher CO₂ emission in the long term. Whereas CO₂ emissions fall slightly below the 1990 level in 2030 in the “Medium gas and soaring oil price” case, they stay above the 1990 level in the entire projection period with soaring gas prices, i.e. when gas and oil prices are coupled. It is far from clear whether the slightly higher renewables share in the “Soaring oil and gas price case” in 2030 (14.0% in gross energy consumption instead of 13.5% with medium gas prices) as well as the somewhat lower import dependency (59.7% in 2030 instead of 61.2%) can outweigh these disadvantages.

Glossary

Carbon intensity: The amount of CO₂ by weight emitted per unit of energy consumed or produced (t of CO₂/tonne of oil equivalent (toe) or MWh)

Clean coal units: A number of innovative, new technologies designed to use coal in a more efficient and cost-effective manner while enhancing environmental protection. Among the most promising technologies are fluidised-bed combustion (PFBC), integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), coal liquefaction and coal gasification.

CO₂ Emissions to GDP: The amount of CO₂ by weight emitted per unit of GDP (carbon intensity of GDP - t of CO₂/MEuro'00).

Cogeneration thermal plant: A system using a common energy source to produce both electricity and steam for other uses, resulting in increased fuel efficiency (see also: CHP).

Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plant (CCGT): A technology which combines gas turbines and steam turbines, connected to one or more electrical generators at the same plant. The gas turbine (usually fuelled by natural gas or oil) produces mechanical power, which drives the generator, and heat in the form of hot exhaust gases. These gases are fed to a boiler, where steam is raised at pressure to drive a conventional steam turbine, which is also connected to an electrical generator. This has the effect of producing additional electricity from the same fuel compared to an open cycle turbine.

Combined Heat and Power: This means cogeneration of useful heat and power (electricity) in a single process. In contrast to conventional power plants that convert only a limited part of the primary energy into electricity with the remainder of this energy being discharged as waste heat. CHP makes use of large parts of this energy for e.g. industrial processes, district heating, and space heating. CHP therefore improves energy efficiency (see also: cogeneration thermal plant).

Efficiency for thermal electricity production: A measure of the efficiency of converting a fuel to electricity and useful heat; heat and electricity output divided by the calorific value of input fuel times 100 (for expressing this ratio in percent).

Efficiency indicator in freight transport (activity related): Energy efficiency in freight transport is computed on the basis of energy use per tonne-km. Given the existence of inconsistencies between transport and energy statistics, absolute numbers (especially at the level of individual Member States) might be misleading in some cases. For that reason, the numbers given are only illustrative of the trends in certain cases.

Efficiency indicator in passenger transport (activity related): Energy efficiency in passenger transport is computed on the basis of energy use per passenger-km travelled. Issues related to consistency of transport and energy statistics also apply to passenger transport (see also: Efficiency indicator in freight transport).

Energy branch consumption: Energy consumed in refineries, electricity and steam generation and in other transformation processes; it does not include the energy input for transformation as such.

Energy intensity: energy consumption/GDP or another indicator for economic activity

Energy intensive industries: Iron and steel, non-ferrous, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and paper and pulp industries.

Final energy demand: Energy finally consumed in the transport, industrial, household and tertiary sectors with tertiary comprising services and agriculture. It excludes deliveries to the energy transformation sector (e.g. power plants) and to the energy branch. It includes electricity consumption in the above final demand sectors.

Freight transport activity: Expressed in tonne kilometres (1 Gtkm = 10^9 tkm); one tkm = one tonne transported a distance of one km. It should be noted that inland navigation includes both waterborne inland transport activity and domestic sea shipping. However, international short sea shipping is not included in the above category as, according to EUROSTAT energy balances, energy needs for international shipping are allocated to bunkers.

Fuel cells: A fuel cell is an electrochemical energy conversion device converting hydrogen and oxygen into electricity and heat with the help of catalysts. The fuel cell provides a direct current voltage that can be used to power various electrical devices including motors and lights.

Fuel input to power generation: Fuel use in electricity, CHP plants and heat plants.

Gas: Includes natural gas, blast furnace gas, coke-oven gas and gasworks gas.

Generation capacity: The maximum rated output of a generator, prime mover, or other electric power production equipment under specific conditions designated by the manufacturer.

Geothermal plant: A plant in which the prime mover is a steam turbine. The turbine is driven either by steam produced from hot water or by natural steam that derives its energy from heat in rocks or fluids beneath the surface of the earth. The energy is extracted by drilling and/or pumping.

Gross Inland Consumption: Quantity of energy consumed within the borders of a country. It is calculated as primary production + recovered products + imports +/- stock changes – exports – bunkers (i.e. quantities supplied to sea-going ships).

Gross Inland Consumption/GDP: Energy intensity indicator calculated as the ratio of total energy consumption to GDP – (toe/MEuro'00).

Hydro power plant: A plant producing energy with the use of moving water. For the purposes of these energy balance projections, hydro excludes pumped storage plants that generate electricity during peak load periods by using water previously pumped into an elevated storage reservoir during off-peak periods when excess generating capacity is available.

Non fossil fuels: Nuclear and renewable energy sources.

Non-energy uses: Non-energy consumption of energy carriers in petrochemicals and other sectors, such as chemical feedstocks, lubricants and asphalt for road construction.

Nuclear power plant: A plant in which a nuclear fission chain reaction can be initiated, controlled, and sustained at a specific rate. They include new nuclear designs (such as the EPR as well as the AP1000 and AP600) with passive safety features (which reduce core fusion probability from 10^{-5} /year of existing nuclear plants to less than 5.10^{-7} /year).

Oil: Includes refinery gas, liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, gasoline, diesel oil, fuel oil, crude oil, naphtha and feedstocks.

Open cycle units: A turbine connected to an electrical generator. Less efficient than a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) because it does not recover and use the heat of the exhaust gases. Open cycle units include polyvalent units, monovalent coal-lignite units, monovalent oil-gas units and monovalent biomass-waste units.

Passenger transport activity: Expressed in passenger kilometres (1 Gpkm = 10^9 pkm); one pkm relates to one person travelling a distance of one km. Passenger transport activity includes energy consuming passenger transport on roads (public and private), by rail, in airplanes and on ships as far as this takes place on rivers, canals, lakes and as domestic sea shipping; international short sea shipping is not included as, according to

EUROSTAT energy balances, energy needs for international shipping are allocated to bunkers.

Primary production: Total indigenous production.

Renewable energy sources: Energy resources that are naturally replenishing but flow-limited. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the amount of energy that is available per unit of time. Renewable energy resources include: biomass, hydro, wind, geothermal, solar, wave and tidal energy.

Solar power plant: A plant producing energy with the use of radiant energy from the sun; includes solar thermal and photovoltaic (direct conversion of solar energy into electricity) plants.

Solids: Include both primary products (hard coal and lignite) and derived fuels (patent fuels, coke, tar, pitch and benzol).

Supercritical polyvalent units: A power plant for which the evaporator part of the boiler operates at pressures above 22.1 MegaPascals (MPa). The cycle-medium in this case is a single phase fluid with homogenous properties and thus there is no need to separate steam from water in a drum, allowing for higher efficiency in power generation.

Thermal power plants: Type of electric generating station in which the source of energy for the prime mover is heat.

Wind power plant: Typically a group of wind turbines interconnected to a common utility system through a system of transformers, distribution lines, and (usually) one substation. Operation, control, and maintenance functions are often centralised through a network of computerised monitoring systems, supplemented by visual inspection.

APPENDIX 1: “Medium gas and soaring oil prices” case results

Summary results by groups of countries (comparison to Baseline)

(1) EUROSTAT Energy Balances do not take into account non-marketed steam, i.e. steam generated - either in boilers or in CHP plants - and used on site by industrial consumers. Using statistical information provided by EUROSTAT on CHP, the non-marketed steam generated in CHP units as well as the corresponding fuel input have been estimated for this study. In the PRIMES model, steam has been attributed to the demand side and the fuel input to the supply side. This approach ensures a better comparability of historical figures with the projections. However, slight differences exist for certain figures related to steam generation - both in terms of final energy demand and transformation input - in this report compared to EUROSTAT energy balances.

Disclaimer: Energy and transport statistics reported in this publication and used for the modelling are taken mainly from EUROSTAT and from the publication "EU Energy and Transport in Figures" of the Directorate General for Energy and Transport. Energy and transport statistical concepts have developed differently in the past according to their individual purposes. Energy demand in transport reflects usually sales of fuels at the point of refuelling, which can differ from the region of consumption. This is particularly relevant for airplanes and trucks. Transport statistics deal with the transport activity within a country but may not always fully include transit shipments. These differences should be borne in mind when comparing energy and transport figures. This applies in particular to transport activity ratios, such as energy efficiency in freight transport, which is measured in tonnes of oil equivalent per million tonne-km.

Abbreviations

GIC: Gross Inland Consumption

CHP: combined heat and power

Geographical regions

EU15: EU15 Member States

EU25: EU15 Member States + New Member States

NMS: New Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia)

EU27: EU25 Member States + Bulgaria + Romania

EU28: EU27 + Turkey

Europe 30: EU28 + Norway + Switzerland

Units

toe: tonne of oil equivalent, or 10^9 kilocalories, or 41.86 GJ (Gigajoule)

Mtoe: million toe

GW: Gigawatt or 10^9 watt

kWh: kilowatt-hour or 10^3 watt-hour

MWh: megawatt-hour or 10^6 watt-hour

TWh: Terawatt-hour or 10^{12} watt-hour

t: metric tonnes, or 1000 kilogrammes

Mt: Million metric tonnes

km: kilometre

pkm: passenger-kilometre (one passenger transported a distance of one kilometre)

tkm: tonne-kilometre (one tonne transported a distance of one kilometre)

Gpkm: Giga passenger-kilometre, or 10^9 passenger-kilometre

Gtkm: Giga tonne-kilometre, or 10^9 tonne-kilometre

APPENDIX 2: “Soaring oil and gas prices” case results

Summary results by groups of countries (comparison to Baseline)

(1) EUROSTAT Energy Balances do not take into account non-marketed steam, i.e. steam generated - either in boilers or in CHP plants - and used on site by industrial consumers. Using statistical information provided by EUROSTAT on CHP, the non-marketed steam generated in CHP units as well as the corresponding fuel input have been estimated for this study. In the PRIMES model, steam has been attributed to the demand side and the fuel input to the supply side. This approach ensures a better comparability of historical figures with the projections. However, slight differences exist for certain figures related to steam generation - both in terms of final energy demand and transformation input - in this report compared to EUROSTAT energy balances.

Disclaimer: Energy and transport statistics reported in this publication and used for the modelling are taken mainly from EUROSTAT and from the publication "EU Energy and Transport in Figures" of the Directorate General for Energy and Transport. Energy and transport statistical concepts have developed differently in the past according to their individual purposes. Energy demand in transport reflects usually sales of fuels at the point of refuelling, which can differ from the region of consumption. This is particularly relevant for airplanes and trucks. Transport statistics deal with the transport activity within a country but may not always fully include transit shipments. These differences should be borne in mind when comparing energy and transport figures. This applies in particular to transport activity ratios, such as energy efficiency in freight transport, which is measured in tonnes of oil equivalent per million tonne-km.

Abbreviations

GIC: Gross Inland Consumption

CHP: combined heat and power

Geographical regions

EU15: EU15 Member States

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