



REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA  
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
AND COMMUNICATIONS

# **RISK-PREPAREDNESS PLAN OF ESTONIA**

07.12.2021

## General information

According to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council (on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC)<sup>1</sup> (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation), article 3 the competent authority in Estonia is Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication. Estonia notified the Electricity Coordination Group of its chosen competent authority on 5 January 2020.

Regional measures cover the Baltic region, where the other Member States are Latvia and Lithuania. In addition, bilateral measures are possible in Estonia with Finland, with which we are in direct connection via submarine cables Estlink 1 and Estlink 2.

In Estonia emergency operations are regulated by various laws - the Emergency Act<sup>2</sup>; the Description of the Vital Service and the requirements for continuity of electricity supply<sup>3</sup>; the requirements and procedure for the vital service continuity risk analysis and plan<sup>4</sup>, their preparation and implementation of the plan etc.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications also has a crisis department, which deals with crisis management daily and has prepared an energy emergency response plan, which is a cooperation agreement to deal with an emergency or imminent threat thereof caused by the serious consequences or long-term interruption of a vital electricity, natural gas, or liquefied fuel supply service.

## Definitions used in the plan

**A vital service** is a service which has a predominant effect on the functioning of society and the interruption of which directly endangers human life or health or the functioning of another vital service or service of general interest. The vital service is considered as a whole, together with the building, equipment, personnel, supplies and the like that are essential for its operation.

**The continuity of a vital service** is the capability of the provider of the vital service to ensure continuous operation and to restore continuous operation after an interruption of the vital service.

**Provider of a service of vital importance** is a legal person who is described in the relevant service sector law (which in this plan is Electricity Market Act<sup>5</sup>) have been designated to perform the function of provider of critical services and to provide essential services.

**An emergency** is an event or a chain of events or an interruption of a vital service which endangers the life or health of many people, causes major proprietary damage, major environmental damage or severe and extensive interferences with the continuity of vital services and resolution of which requires the prompt coordinated activities of several authorities or persons involved by them, the application of a command organization different from usual and the involvement of more persons and means than usual.

**Emergency response** is the application of measures and resources to address the severe or long-term disruption of a vital service and to restore the viability of the vital service.

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<sup>1</sup> [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L\\_.2019.158.01.0001.01.ENG](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.158.01.0001.01.ENG)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/528062021002/consolide/current>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/510102019001>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/525092017001/consolide>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/504112021001/consolide>

**The emergency management structure** is a functional unit formed to manage emergency management with its working environment, composition, and procedures. The emergency management structure is generally called the headquarters across the agencies.

**Readiness** is an indicator that characterizes the ability of an institution or its designated entity to perform the tasks assigned to it at a given point in time.

## 1

### SUMMARY OF THE ELECTRICITY CRISIS SCENARIOS

#### Identification of national electricity crisis scenarios

The national electricity crisis scenarios have been identified based on the risks referred to the Regulation in Article 5(2) and are consistent with the regional electricity crisis scenarios identified in accordance with Article 6(1). Estonia has identified seven possible electricity crisis scenarios.

| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
|----|--|--|
| 1  | Simultaneous shutdown of several important network elements due to natural phenomena                     | Scenario 16: Multiple failures caused by extreme weather situation   |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
| 2  | Blackout of the electrical system or part thereof because of a physical attack on the control center     | Scenario 4: Physical attack against control center's   |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
| 3  | Blackout of an electrical system or part thereof because of a physical attack on major network equipment | Scenario 3: Physical attack against critical assets  |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
| 4  | Blackout of an electrical system or part thereof because of a cyber attack                               | Scenario 1: Cyberattack on business-critical ICT infrastructure of entities which are physically connected to the power grid |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
| 5  | Power outages during a pandemic due to lack of qualified personnel                                       | Scenario 27: Pandemic  |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |
| 6  | Decreased reliability of the electricity system due to the energy systems of non-EU countries            | No appropriate ENTSOE scenario   |
| Nr | Estonian scenario  | ENTSOE regional scenario   |

|   |   |                         |
|---|---|-------------------------|
| 7 | Shortage of production capacity due to exceptionally cold weather | Scenario 10: Cold spell |
|---|---|-------------------------|

## **Estonian risks in relation to the ownership of infrastructure relevant for security of electricity supply**

The risks regarding the TSO are very low, almost non-existent in relation to the ownership of infrastructure relevant for security of electricity supply and any measures taken to prevent or mitigate such risks, pursuant to Article 7(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/941 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector.

We have only one TSO and the owner of the TSO is the Government of Estonia. We have also very strong regulation, so it's not very easy process to switch the owner of the TSO.

For example, the Electricity Market Act (EMA)<sup>6</sup> says that the transmission network operator may not at the same time be a distribution network operator or belong to the same group with any undertaking which engages in activities related to generating or selling electricity. (§ 16 (4) EMA)

A person who controls the transmission network operator may not control, or exercise any other rights in respect of, an undertaking which produces or sells gas or electricity. A person who controls an undertaking which produces or sells electricity may not control, or exercise any other rights in respect of, the transmission network operator, or in respect of an undertaking which provides gas transmission services. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (1) EMA)

The person who appoints members of the supervisory or management board of the transmission network operator or members of a body that legally represents the transmission network operator may not have control over an undertaking which produces or sells gas or electricity or exercise any other rights in respect of that undertaking. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (3) EMA)

The other rights referred to in subsections 1 and 3 of this section include, first and foremost, voting rights, the right to appoint members to the supervisory or management board of the undertaking or to a body that legally represents the undertaking, holding a controlling interest in the undertaking, or using or disposing of property forming a part of the transmission network. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (3<sup>1</sup>) EMA)

A member of the supervisory or management board of the transmission network operator may not be a member of the supervisory or management board of an undertaking which produces or sells electricity or a member of a body that legally represents such an undertaking. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (4) EMA).

If the person referred to in subsections 1 and 3 of this section is the State, the transmission network operator may not be controlled by the same authority that controls an undertaking which produces or sells electricity. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (5) EMA)

An undertaking engaged in production or sale may not have control over a transmission network operator in a member state of the EU that applies the requirement of the separation of ownership of transmission network operators from undertakings engaged in production and sale. (§ 18<sup>1</sup> (6) EMA)

The Competition Authority assesses the compliance of a transmission system operator with the requirements provided by law (§ 26<sup>1</sup> (1) of the EMA)

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/504112021001/consolide>

§ 94<sup>1</sup> of the Electricity Market Act also provides for the tasks of the Competition Authority in the ex-post assessment of the compliance of a transmission system operator.

There are no plans to make changes in the ownership of the TSO but if it were the case then the potential new owner would have to go through a strict assessment to understand if the new owner might pose a threat to energy security.

## 2

### **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY**

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications crisis department has prepared an energy emergency response plan, which is a cooperation agreement to deal with an emergency or imminent threat thereof caused by the serious consequences or long-term interruption of a vital electricity supply service. The emergency plan includes, among other things, list of authorities and persons involved in emergency response and their tasks, which has been agreed during consultations.

#### **Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MEAC) as a competent authority:**

- leads the resolution of the emergency
- coordinates the activities of electricity supply service providers and their state support in resolving emergencies
- forms emergency management structures and decides on the involvement of other agencies and persons (involved in the resolution of the emergency and directly affected by the emergency)
- agrees with the agencies and persons involved in the resolution of the emergency on the tasks, their division of responsibilities and the order of importance of the implementation
- sets the objective or objectives to which the emergency response activities contribute
- coordinates the mobilization and use of resources to deal with emergencies and the implementation of measures
- compiles in cooperation with other authorities and legal entities, assessments of the impact of an emergency on other vital services
- organizes the exchange of information between agencies and persons participating in the resolution of an emergency or persons involved in the resolution of an emergency, including ensuring the situational awareness of the Government of the Republic and other ministries
- organizes cooperation with foreign institutions and international organizations on issues related to emergency response
- provides instructions for conduct and informs the public about the emergency, its danger, and its resolution.

#### **Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA):**

- if necessary and in cooperation with the Emergency Communication Leading Unit, ensures that Estonian foreign missions are informed in the host countries and, if necessary, support in communicating with the foreign media and amplifying messages related to Estonia's image
- ensures that international organizations are kept informed where appropriate
- informs foreign missions in Estonia, if necessary, of the general status of emergency response (situation picture), if necessary, sends them notifications (SMS messages) and instructions on

conduct in accordance with the information and request received from the event management structure

- organizes, at the request of the emergency management authority, a question hour for foreign missions or journalists located in Estonia, where the representative of the emergency management authority shares information on the resolution of the emergency and related matters (codes of conduct, etc.).

**Estonian Rescue Board (ERB)** supports the MEAC in managing emergency response at regional / local level:

- involves the agencies and persons designated by the MEAC in resolving the emergency and coordinates their activities and co-operation in ensuring situational awareness and resolving the emergency
- organizes the exchange of information between the regional structural units and local government units of the executive state authorities affected by the emergency and participating in the resolution of the emergency, and the emergency management structure, i.e., the headquarters of the MEAC
- monitors and analyzes the development of events related to the resolution of emergency situations and submits its observations and proposals to the MEAC, including making proposals regarding priority objects and areas for the restoration of vital services
- participates in issuing codes of conduct and informing the public about the emergency, its danger and resolution.

**Emergency Response Centre (ERC):**

- based on a cooperation agreement, supports the MEAC in issuing codes of conduct and informing the public about the emergency, its danger and resolving it via a crisis information telephone.

**Local government unit (LGU):**

- manages in its administrative territory an emergency caused by the interruption of vital services provided for in subsection 36 (4) of the Emergency Act and cooperate with the emergency response headquarters
- makes proposals for priority sites and areas for the restoration of vital services.

There are 79 local governments in Estonia, which are divided into 15 cities and 64 rural municipalities, which decide and organize issues of local life independently. Regardless of their size, local governments must perform the same tasks everywhere in Estonia and offer the same services to residents. The territory of local governments or administrative units is in turn divided into settlement units: cities, towns, small towns, villages.

**Provider of a service of vital importance:**

- monitors the state of service continuity

- in the event of a disruption or interruption of the business continuity of service, establish a business continuity plan and restore business continuity
- forwards information on the state of business continuity to the MEAC
- monitors and analyzes the development of events related to the resolution of the emergency and submits its observations and proposals to the MEAC, including, if necessary, forwards a request for assistance in restoring the continuity of the service
- participates in the work of the emergency management structure formed by the MEAC on a needs-based basis
- participates in the coordination of the MEAC in informing the public about the resolution of the emergency.

According to § 21<sup>1</sup> of the Electricity Market Act<sup>7</sup>, the provider of vital services in the electricity sector in Estonia are

- a producer whose power station has a net capacity exceeding 200 MW - Enefit Energiatootmine AS meets the criteria
- a line possessor whose power line crosses the national border and has a transmission capacity exceeding 100 MW - Elering AS meets the criteria
- the transmission network operator (TSO) - Elering AS meets the criteria
- a distribution network operator (DSO) whose distribution network connects to more than 10,000 consumers - Elektrilevi OÜ, VKG Elektrivõrgud OÜ and AS Imatra Elekter meets the criteria.

Under the Natural Gas Act<sup>8</sup>, a provider of a vital service for the supply of natural gas is an undertaking that provides a transmission service in the gas network and to whose distribution network more than 10,000 consumers are connected.

The following meet the criteria:

- AS Elering;
- AS Gaasivõrgud.

### 3

## PROCEDURES AND MEASURES IN THE ELECTRICITY CRISIS

### 3.1. National procedures and measures

In the event of severe consequences or a long-term interruption of a vital electricity supply, the plan shall be implemented if there is a suspicion or threat of the fulfillment of one of the following conditions or if one of the following conditions has already been fulfilled:

- the line operator, transmission system operator or network operator fails to comply with the time allowed for interruption of the vital service established in § 4, 4<sup>1</sup>, 5 and 6 of the Regulation on Quality Requirements for Network Services<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/504112021001/consolide>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511012021009/consolide>

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/519122019004/consolide>

- in the event of a service interruption, there is a risk of another emergency resulting from the interruption of a vital service.

The plan is implemented in a situation where the implementation of the business continuity plans of a vital service provider is not sufficient to solve an emergency, i.e., the vital service provider needs to act by the state to ensure business continuity.

The plan shall also be implemented in a situation where the severe or long-term disruption of a vital service of electricity poses a risk of an emergency of another vital service.

The implementation of the plan will be terminated if none of the above situations exist, i.e., with serious consequences for the vital service, or a long-term interruption has been resolved.

Due to electricity supply emergencies may cause different events or chains of events and consequences may extend to different areas, other emergency plans (e.g., rescue emergency plan, cyber incident emergency plan, police emergency plan, etc.) may be implemented in parallel with this emergency plan.

### **3.1.1 Arrangements for the exchange of information in the event of a suspicion or threat of an emergency**

The provider of a vital service for the supply of electricity and natural gas shall notify the MEAC of the emergency caused by the service interruption according to the provided e-mail address.

The notification of vital service providers to the MEAC shall contain at least the following information:

- the actual or presumed cause of the interruption and a brief description of the current situation
- the time and duration of the interruption
- measures taken and to be taken to reduce the impact of the resumption of service or interruption of service
- preliminary data on the foreseeable damage to the consumer of the service
- preliminary data on the expected impact on the continuity of other vital services
- where relevant, preliminary data on foreseeable effects on the environment
- is assistance from the MEAC government area necessary in connection with the incident?

Based on the information gathered, the MEAC decides whether it is an emergency and if it is necessary to implement the emergency response plan and inform the concerned and the contacts by telephone and / or e-mail.

### **3.1.2 Arrangements for the exchange of information during emergency response**

In the event of monitoring an emergency and / or its threat, channels for exchanging information (e.g., e-mail lists, electronic messaging, and file exchange environments) will be agreed between the agencies. If the Internet environment does not work, alternative transmission methods (from a paper report to a telephone call) will be agreed.

In the event of an emergency, at least 2 overviews of the situation per day shall be prepared by the emergency management structure, i.e., the headquarters, and forwarded to the relevant authorities and persons no later than 2 hours after the start of the headquarters work and thereafter at 10:30 and



18:30, unless otherwise agreed. If necessary, situation reviews can be prepared with a more frequent or sparse period. To better organize the activities of the headquarters and the resolution of the emergency, regular and extraordinary meetings are held by the Deputy Head of the Headquarters, which ensures the awareness of the parties.

A regular meeting is a meeting planned in the action plan of the headquarters to launch, continue, or summarize activities. The purpose of the regular meetings is to collect and exchange information presented by the group leaders and representatives of the involved institutions, and to share, change and confirm tasks, from which a situation picture of the current situation is prepared, and the information is the basis for further decisions and activities.

An extraordinary meeting is a meeting convened to identify urgent and essential circumstances, assign tasks, make quick decisions, exchange information, and start or close headquarters. When convening extraordinary meetings, the purpose of the meeting shall be communicated.

The information on the meetings must include at least the following:

- a summary of the current situation regarding activities (including main activities, problems, resources involved, interim reports and summaries, etc.)
- a brief overview of the planned activities
- a forecast of resource requirements for the following period
- problem statements, together with possible solutions and proposals
- confirmation of the time of the next meeting.

### **3.1.3 Informing the public**

The aim of informing the public in an emergency is to ensure that the public is quickly, professionally, and accurately informed of what is happening, including the provision of codes of conduct, through the most effective activities.

In organizing public information, the MEAC coordinates communication activities with agencies or providers of vital services involved in resolving emergencies and with agencies and persons affected by the consequences of an emergency.

### **3.1.4 Order for provision of vital service in case of interruption of vital service**

Power supply:

- vital service providers shall implement business continuity plans and the measures described therein to restore business continuity and provide the public with ongoing information on their activities
- the distribution network operators Elektrilevi OÜ, VKG Elektrivõrgud OÜ and AS Imatra Elekter shall proceed from the priority principles when restoring the electricity supply, which is described in section 3.1.6
- to ensure the continuity of the electricity system, the transmission system operator Elering AS and the distribution network operators Elektrilevi OÜ, VKG Elektrivõrgud OÜ and AS Imatra Elekter limit the electricity consumption by switching off the consumption to the required extent from the substations. Efforts are being made to ensure that interruptions do not last more than a few hours and, if necessary, rotate between regions

- It is necessary for institutions and persons whose functionality depends on the electricity supply to ensure the supply of electricity in autonomous electricity supply in critical buildings. The capacity of the autonomous electricity supply must generally be ensured by the institution and the person himself or if it is possible then to purchase this service.

### **3.1.5 Priorities for recovery of electricity**

#### **TSO priorities restoring the Estonian electricity system:**

When the Estonian power system shuts down, HVDC links can be used to restore from a blackout.

Elering cannot have all the necessary resources at its disposal to restore the electricity supply. We depend on the Finnish system operator's ability to provide black start assistance. Secondly, we depend on the possibilities of Narva Power Plant to put our units into operation. Thirdly, when synchronizing with the Latvian electricity system, we depend about the Latvian electricity system. When performing switching operations, we depend on the contract partners of the switching service.

#### **DSO following priorities in restoring the electricity supply:**

In the first place, to restore the electricity supply at the objects where the interruption of the electricity supply involves an immediate danger to human life.

In the second place, to restore the electricity supply to objects that ensure the continuity of other vital services or a wide range of national defense, but in the second order, the list of objects to be restored includes objects that ensure communication between vital services and state services continuity of action.

In the third place, to restore electricity supply to objects that are important for the provision of public services or economically important or places of mass gathering.

In the fourth order, to restore the electricity supply at the objects of business customers with a consumption of more than 100,000 kWh / a year and all customers connected at medium voltage (on a 6-35 kV line in terms of standard conditions) whose consumption is less than 100,000 kWh.

The first two categories are critical to emergency response.

### **3.2. Regional and bilateral procedures and measures**

The power system of the Baltic States is currently technically part of the Integrated Power System / Unified Power System (IPS/UPS) of Russia. The frequency, which is the most important parameter of a power system, is currently controlled by Russia. Considering Baltic power systems plans of de-synchronization, Russia has finalized reinforcement of the Russian internal transmission network (incl. Kaliningrad region) considering the scenario of Baltics power systems de-synchronization from the IPS/UPS system. As Baltics are still the part of IPS/UPS system, Russian power system has capability to influence physical and commercial energy flows in the Baltic States.

The strategic goal and big challenge of the Baltic States is to disconnect their power systems from the Integrated Power System / Unified Power System (IPS/UPS) of Russia and join the Continental European power grid and frequency area in January 2026.

Finland and Estonia have an agreement on system services on the interconnections between.

Elering and Fingrid have agreed upon the terms and conditions on the use and compensation of the system services between the Estonian and Finnish power systems and at each end of the Interconnections.

Estonia and Finland shall use their best reasonable endeavors to maintain technical usability of the system services. In case of any failure or breakdown the Parties shall together take necessary actions to normalize the services. The liabilities have been defined in the Interconnection Agreement.

Also Estonia, Finland and Latvia, having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938<sup>10</sup> of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply, and particularly to Article 13 of the Regulation, taking note of Recommendation (EU) 2018/177<sup>11</sup> of the European Commission, of 2 February 2018, on the elements to be included in the technical, legal and financial arrangements between Member States for the application of the solidarity mechanism under Article 13 of the Regulation, aiming to alleviate the effects of a severe emergency and to safeguard the supply of gas to the solidarity protected customers, considering that solidarity is needed to safeguard the security of gas supply in the Union, have agreed on solidarity measures to safeguard the security of gas supply. The agreements will be signed at the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022.

#### 4

### CRISIS COORDINATOR

The crisis coordinator in Estonia is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications has developed an Emergency Response Plan, which precisely describes all agencies and persons involved in resolving the Emergency and their tasks.

The role of the crisis coordinator is also described separately in section 2.

Contact details of the Estonian crisis coordinator: National Situational Center, Government Office

phone: + 372 693 5338

e-mail: [sitke@mkm.ee](mailto:sitke@mkm.ee)

#### 5

### STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

According to the Emergency Act subsection 15 an emergency response plan is drawn up for resolving an emergency. An emergency response plan is a cooperation agreement by which the authority

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<sup>10</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32017R1938>

<sup>11</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2018/177>

coordinating the resolution of an emergency and an authority or person involved in resolving the emergency agree upon the organization of resolution of the emergency.

In addition, an emergency response plan is prepared by an authority organizing the continuity of a vital service for resolving an emergency caused by an interruption with severe consequences or prolonged interruption of the vital service, which is coordinated with the relevant ministry and the Ministry of the Interior. The local authority obtains the approval of the Rescue Board for the emergency response plan.

The Ministry or the Rescue Board does not approve an emergency response plan if the plan does not meet the requirements, is not in compliance with the actual circumstances or does not allow a sufficiently quick and successful resolution of the emergency.

The authority in charge of the preparation of an emergency response plan and an authority involved in its preparation have the right to information necessary for preparing the plan from other authorities and persons.

Pursuant to the law, all parties concerned have been consulted and, as a result, the tasks for emergency response have been allocated, which are described in more detail in point 2.

In preparing this risk-preparedness plan, we have consulted the relevant network operators, the Crisis Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the competent authorities of Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.

## 6

### EMERGENCY TESTS AND EXERCISES

The list of exercises conducted with Estonian TSO Elering's participation in 2019 was as follows:

| <b>Time of exercise</b> | <b>Name of the exercise</b>  | <b>Purpose /result</b> |
|-------------------------|--|------------------------|
| 25.03.2019              | Exercise FINEST 19 of the Estonian Information System Authority, the Finnish Cyber Security Center, Finnish TSO Fingrid and Estonian TSO Elering |                        |
| 02-09.05.2019           | Exercise Cyberstorm 2019 of the Estonian Information System Authority, Estonian energy companies and the Estonian Defense League                 |                        |
| 15-17.05.2019           | Joint emergency training of the control centers of the Baltic electricity TSOs   |                        |
| 22-24.05.2019           | Joint emergency training of the control centers of the Baltic electricity TSOs   |                        |

|               |   |  |
|---------------|---|--|
| 27-29.05.2019 | Joint emergency training of the control centers of the Baltic electricity TSOs  |  |
| 28.08.2019    | Fire at Kiisa emergency power plant no.2  | Practicing the activities of the employees of the Elering Operations Department and the control center in the event of a fire. |
| 28.08.2019    | Emergency training  |  |
| 11.12.2019    | Joint emergency training of TSO Elering and DSO Elektrilevi control centers   |  |
| Constantly    | Regular emergency trainings for shift managers and dispatchers at Elering's control center (for both the electricity and gas systems) |  |
| Constantly    | Fire drills in Elering's office   | Practicing the activities of Elering employees in the event of a fire.   |

The list of exercises conducted with Estonian TSO Elering's participation in 2020 was as follows:

| <b>Time of exercise</b> | <b>Name of the exercise</b>   | <b>Purpose /result</b>  |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| 2020 I half-year        | Joint emergency training of the control centers of the Baltic TSOs  |   |
| 2020 II half-year       | Joint emergency training of TSO Elering and DSO Elektrilevi control centers   |   |
| Constantly              | Regular emergency trainings for shift managers and dispatchers at Elering's control center (for both the electricity and gas systems) |   |
| Constantly              | Fire drills in Elering's office   | Practicing the activities of Elering employees in the event of a fire |

Crisis management exercises in 2021, where Estonia has participated was as follows:

| <b>Time of exercise</b> | <b>Name of the exercise</b>  | <b>Purpose /result</b> |
|-------------------------|--|------------------------|
| September 2021          | Floods and disruption of vital services<br>Estonian Rescue Board and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications |                        |
| 20-24.09.2021           | NATO CORE21-B TTX in Lithuania   |                        |

|              |  |  |
|--------------|--|--|
|              | NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, European Commission Joint Research Centre, Baltic States, and other Member States |  |
| October 2021 | International Nuclear Accident Exercise NUCLEX2021   |  |

Pursuant to Section 38 (3) (1 and (7 of the Emergency Act a provider of a vital service is required to prepare the continuity risk assessment and plan of the vital service provided thereby and organize exercises to verify the continuity of the vital service provided thereby at least once every two years. The list of vital service providers is described in Chapter 2.