

APPROVED
By Order No 1-32
of the Minister of Energy
of the Republic of Lithuania
of 17 January 2022

PLAN ON RISK-PREPAREDNESS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR

CHAPTER I GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Lithuania's electric power system operates within a synchronous system of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPS/UPS) that joins together the electricity systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (BRELL). The frequency of the BRELL power sub-systems is centrally managed and coordinated by the Energy System of the Russian Federation (Russian Unified Energy System). Therefore, the Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that are the European Union (EU) Member States seek to interconnect their electricity systems for synchronous operation with the Continental European networks. Cross-border links with Poland (LitPol Link) and Sweden (NordBalt) are also operated in Lithuania.

2. The Regional and Sectoral Risk Preparedness Plan for the Electricity Sector (the Plan):

2.1. Submits the summary of regional and national crisis scenarios in the electricity sector;

2.2. Specifies roles and responsibilities of the competent authority as well as tasks assigned to other state institutions;

2.3. Describes national procedures and measures applied in the event of a crisis in the electricity sector;

2.4. Describes regional and bilateral procedures and measures applied in the event of a crisis in the electricity sector;

2.5. Specifies the crisis coordinator and defines its role;

2.6. Describes the stakeholder consultation mechanism and consultations results;

2.7. Provides information about testing of the procedures identified in the Plan.

3. The public body responsible for the preparation of the Plan is the Lithuanian Energy Agency (hereinafter - the Agency).

4. The terms used in the Plan are in line with the terms used in the Republic of Lithuania Law on Energy, Republic of Lithuania Law on Electricity, Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk management preparedness in the electricity sector and other legal acts.

5. In accordance with Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/941, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has identified regional scenarios of crisis in the electricity sector (the regional crisis scenarios) in its report *Risk-preparedness Regulation – Identification of Regional Electricity Crisis Scenarios* of 7 September 2020 (the Report).

6. The national electricity sector crisis scenarios took into account the regional crisis scenarios presented in the Report and the national specificities of the electricity system.

CHAPTER II NATIONAL ELECTRICITY SECTOR CRISIS SCENARIOS

7. The Agency acting in accordance with the List of Measures to Ensure Security of Electricity Supply approved by Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No 1188 of 28 October 2020 'On the approval of the List of Measures to Ensure Security of Electricity Supply (the List) has identified, in cooperation with the TSO, the following national electricity sector crisis scenarios (the 'National Crisis Scenarios'). A summary of the National Crisis Scenarios is provided below:

7.1. Scenario: Heat

Cause	Maximum air temperature reaches or exceeds 30°C for three or more consecutive days.
Impact on the system	- Significant increases in reservoir and river water temperatures (close to the maximum environmental limit for thermal generation);

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low rainfall, resulting in lower water levels in reservoirs and rivers; - Increased demand for electricity for air conditioning needs; - Reduced generation due to limited cooling capacities in thermal power plants (limited water quantities and/or high water temperature); - Reduced availability of generation by hydro-electric power plants; - Reduced generation due to limited transmission capacities in transmission and distribution systems – extremely low generation by wind power plants (there is no or almost no wind during a heat wave); - Reduced imports and/or transmission capacities due to thermal restrictions on transmission lines; - Overloaded national transmission lines restrict import capacities (limited opportunities for importing from another TSO); - Discontinuation of critical generating sources (scheduled/unscheduled).
Consequences for the system	<p>Lithuania is connected to the IPS/UPS system through Estonia: Overloading of the Estonia-Latvia cross-section.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduced generation capacities of power plants; - Sudden disconnection of a number of generation units due to cooling deficiency; - Overloading of certain network elements leading to an impact on N-1 criterion due to disconnection of lowered transmission lines and increased load; - Restricted cable capacities due to increased demand for electricity for air conditioning. <p>Belarus-Lithuania cross-section disconnected. The Baltic States are connected to the IPS/UPS system only through the Estonia-Russia and Estonia-Latvia cross-sections. Impact duration up to 36 hours, i. e. until the next day-ahead session on the exchange.</p>
Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia and Latvia (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	<p>Lithuania's power system does not have connection lines with Belarus and is synchronised through Estonia.</p> <p>Overload of the Baltic States' intersystem cross-sections; activation of power reserves in Lithuania.</p>
Season	Summer
Load	Maximum

7.2. Scenario: Severe frost

Cause	Air temperature is $\leq 30^{\circ}\text{C}$ for one - three days in a row
Impact on the system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Frozen water in surface water bodies (lakes, rivers etc.), their capacities are depleted; - Increased demand for electricity due to cold weather; - Restrictions on generation due to reduced capacities for the cooling of generating equipment (frozen water bodies, operational problems of the plant); - Reduced amounts of electricity produced by hydro-electric power plants; - Due to weather conditions, some elements of the network are under increased pressure (covered with ice, drooped), which reduced network reliability.
Consequences for the system	<p>Lithuania is connected to the IPS/UPS system through Estonia: Overloading of the Estonia-Latvia cross-section.</p> <p>Belarus-Lithuania cross-section disconnected. The Baltic States are connected to the IPS/UPS system only through the Estonia-Russia and Estonia-Latvia cross-sections. Impact duration up to 36 hours, i. e. until the next day-ahead session on the exchange.</p>

Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia and Latvia (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	Lithuania's power system does not have connection lines with Belarus and is synchronised through Estonia. Overload of the Baltic States' intersystem cross-sections; activation of power reserves in Lithuania.
Season	Winter
Load	Maximum

7.3. Scenario: Influence of neighbouring countries (unwanted intersystem power flows).

Cause	Due to repairs of overhead lines, the intersystem cross-section Russia-Belarus is reduced 60% down to 500 MW.
Impact on the system	Disconnection of a unit of Belarusian nuclear power plant (1200 MW). Byelorussian deficit 1200 MW. Secondary emergency reserves not activated within 15 min. Large non-scheduled power flows recorded, in particular at intersystem lines, therefore, criterion N-1 is not fulfilled and reserves must be activated (re-dispatching). Belarus-Lithuania cross-section disconnected. Impact duration up to 36 hours, i. e. until the next day-ahead session on the exchange.
Consequences for the system	Lithuania is connected to the IPS/UPS system through Estonia: Overloading of the Estonia-Latvia cross-section. Distortion of control regimes: A significant increase in unwanted power flows that causes overloading of transmission lines and other elements of the system. In the worst-case scenario, the TSO is in a situation where all possible recovery actions are exhausted. N-1 criterion is not met, there is not enough time to implement multilateral recovery actions, automatic and/or cascade disconnections of network elements start; finally, there is a risk of switching to the regime of an island in a synchronous zone or occurrence of local and/or regional blackouts.
Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia and Latvia (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	Lithuania's power system does not have connection lines with Belarus and is synchronised through Estonia. Overload of the Baltic States' intersystem cross-sections; activation of power reserves in Lithuania.
Season	All seasons
Load	Any

7.4. Scenario: Cyber attack

Cause	Cyber-attack in critical information infrastructure (CII) of LITGRID AB. Attack against critical systems of TSO, DSO, power plants and major users.
Impact on the system	According to IT experts, CII recovery may take up to 24 hours. In the event of cyber-attack in the 330 kV relay protection and automation (RPA) terminals of the system – recovery time 120 hours.
Consequences for the system	Blackout or isolation of the Lithuanian power system. Impact on control: The attacker can access one or more critical ICT systems of the TSO, DSO power plants or their operators. The perpetrator of a cyber-attack is able to act as a member of staff working with the systems – can switch lines/transformers, change reserve schedules of the power plants, manipulate trading schedules (of market participants or other TSOs). Manipulations continue until the attacker is stopped.

	Distortion of control regimes – the attacker is in control of the system and can take any actions including blocking access for constant system users. Security of supply is affected. As long as the attacker has access to the system and can overtake control, he can switch off the loads and even all the DSO zones by switching off the supply transformers.
Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Poland (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	Depending on the type and scope of impact, the following actions are taken: a) Neutralising and isolating the attack; b) Restoring dispatch control and operation; c) Manual control of the power system (blackout/black start/isolated operation in the power system of the Baltic States).
Season	Any
Load	Any

7.5. Scenario: Pandemic

Cause	A pandemic is declared. Critical staff fall ill and cannot work.
Impact on the system	Over 75% of LITGRID AB's critical staff are ill and cannot work
Consequences for the system	Impact on security of supply: - Overloaded/reduced operational staff or service staff, resulting in unscheduled stopping of power plants; - Additional pandemic control measures implemented by the government hinder maintenance or scheduled repairs, which may lead to unscheduled stopping of power plants. Impact on control: - Overloaded/reduced operational staff responsible for repairs, resulting in lack of network maintenance; - Additional pandemic control measures implemented by the government hinder TSO's works in the network. Distortion of control regimes: - Overloaded/reduced human resources at control centres, which poses a threat to the system control. In addition, due to personal situation, employees may be unable to arrive to work even with precaution measures implemented. Control centres, within the chain from power generation to supply, may lack employees or may be staffed with people who do not have required expertise.
Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Poland (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	Blackout. Black start and isolated operation in the power system of the Baltic States.
Season	All seasons
Load	Any

7.6. Scenario: Lack of capacities

Cause	Unavailability of LitPol Link or NordBalt due to failures of electrical equipment and lines. The Lithuanian electricity system is inadequate and does not have sufficient transmission system capacities for import from third countries.
Impact on the system	Lithuania's electricity system demand – 2000 MW; the Lithuanian Power Plant operating at full capacity (1050 MW). Due to a failure in the HVDC converter, Lithuania's electricity system remains without cross-border links with the electricity systems of continental Europe.

	HVDC links remain inoperative for at least two weeks, and the Lithuanian system is fully dependent on import from third countries.
Consequences for the system	Overload of intersystem cross-sections with Latvia and Belarus; Kruonis hydro pumped storage plants operates at maximum capacity; upper reservoir 145 m. Energy supply disrupted for 30% of users.
Impact on neighbouring countries	Impact on Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Poland (impact on non-EU states is not assessed).
Crisis management conditions and actions	Blackout. Black start and isolated operation in the power system of the Baltic States.
Season	Winter
Load	Maximum

CHAPTER III ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY

8. The Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania shall:

8.1. coordinate the drafting of the Plan;

8.2. submit the draft Plan for consultations to the competent authorities of the Member States of the Baltic Region and of the directly connected Member States as well as to the ENTSO-E Steering Group;

8.3. approve the Plan and publish it on the website of the Ministry of Energy;

8.4. ensure that confidentiality of classified information is maintained;

8.5. in collaboration with the TSO and other stakeholders, tests the effectiveness of the procedures set out in the Plan to prevent crises in the electricity sector and performs modelling of crises in the electricity sector on a periodic basis but at least once in two years;

8.6. manage crises in the electricity sector;

8.7. inform the Member States of the Baltic Region, the directly connected Member States and the European Commission (the 'Commission') about a crisis in the electricity sector including provision of information about the causes of the crisis, measures aimed at mitigating the crisis – both currently implemented and planned, and the need for assistance from other Member States;

8.8. submit an ex-post electricity sector crisis assessment report to the ENTSO-E Steering Group and the Commission;

8.9. seek to ensure that all risks related to the security of electricity supply are assessed according to the rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/941 and in particular Chapter IV thereof. For this purpose, the Ministry of Energy collaborates with the State Energy Regulatory Authority (the 'Council'), ENTSO-E, regional coordination centres and other stakeholders.

9. The Agency shall:

9.1. identify and update the national crisis criteria according to the procedure prescribed in the List and submit them to the Ministry of Energy;

9.2. submit to the Ministry of Energy, along with the national crisis scenarios, a risk assessment in relation to the ownership rights to the infrastructure critical for the security of electricity supply and proposals for measures to prevent or reduce such risk; also specify the reasons why such measures are necessary and proportional;

9.3. prepare and update the draft Plan according to a procedure prescribed by the List;

9.4. cooperate with the TSO and consult with the Ministry of Energy, the Council, the STO, other interested electricity producers and service providers, and other electricity undertakings and consumers whose facilities are connected to the transmission grids, in the preparation of the Plan and in the preparation and updating of national crisis scenarios.

CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURES AND MEASURES IN THE ELECTRICITY CRISIS
SECTION ONE
NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND MEASURES

Procedures and measures in the electricity crisis

10. In the event of an electricity sector crisis, the Ministry of Energy shall initiate declaration of an energy emergency.

11. Information about existing or imminent/unavoidable electricity sector crisis, which may provide grounds for declaring an energy emergency, shall be provided to the Ministry of Energy by:

11.1. TSO or DSO;

11.2. Operator of the electricity exchange;

11.3. The Council;

11.4. Another Member State;

12. Information about existing or imminent/unavoidable electricity sector crisis shall be provided to the Ministry of Energy when a situation meets the criteria for a national-level emergency as stated in the Law on Civil Protection, and in other cases, when it is deemed that supply of electricity may be reduced or is reduced to such extent that there is a threat to security/health of the population or functioning of the economy.

13. When informing the Ministry of Energy about the existing or imminent/unavoidable electricity sector crisis, the TSO and the DSO shall specify the cause of disruption in the electricity supply, grounds for the declaration of an energy emergency, measures aimed at mitigating the emergency – currently implemented or planned, and the need for assistance from other Member States.

14. The energy emergency shall be declared and recalled according to a procedure set out in Article 33 of the Law on Energy.

15. Upon declaration of the energy emergency, the Ministry of Energy shall notify this without delay to the competent authorities of the same region and, if a Member State is not in the same region – competent authorities of directly connected Member States, and the Commission and shall furnish them with the information referred to in p. 12 of the Plan.

16. Upon declaration of the energy emergency, the TSO and DSO shall provide to the Ministry of Energy, at intervals set by the latter, updated information about the situation of electricity supply.

17. Upon declaration of the energy emergency, the measures established in the Plan, the Law on Electricity, the Law on Civil Protection, Regulation (EU) 2019/941 and other legal acts governing the management of emergencies shall be implemented.

18. After the end of the energy emergency, the Ministry of Energy shall, on consultation with the Council, submit without delay but no later than within three months after lifting of the emergency, an ex-post electricity sector crisis assessment report to the ENTSO-E Steering Group and the Commission.

19. The Ministry of Energy shall present the exp post assessment results at the meeting of the ENTSO-E Steering Group. Results of the assessment are included in the updated Plan.

Preventive and preparatory measures

20. Security of electricity supply can be ensured through implementation of preventive and preparatory measures.

21. Preventive market-based measures:

21.1. ensuring the active power reserves;

21.2. ensuring isolated operation of the electricity system;

21.3. demand management measures provided for in the balancing agreements with balancing service providers;

22. Preventive non-market-based measures:

22.1. accident/disruption prevention and response measures;

22.2. changing the operating conditions of the transmission system infrastructure to ensure that the N-1 criterion is met;

23. Preparatory measures:

- 23.1. preparing the accident prevention and response plan;
- 23.2. preparing a plan for system recovery upon a blackout.

Crisis mitigation measures

24. An electricity sector crisis can be mitigated by the following measures:

24.1. Management of the active power and the electricity balance within the electric power system control region in order to maintain the synchronous zone frequency that does not exceed set limits – performed during primary, secondary and tertiary regulation of the active power during which the active power reserves maintained in the control region are activated;

24.1.1. Primary active power control is designed to maintain the balance of active powers and to stabilise the system frequency within specified limits by automatically activating the primary active power reserve fully within a maximum of 30 seconds. after receipt of an instruction from the TSO's system control operator. Primary active power control shall be carried out by automatic speed governors of the electrical units;

24.1.2. Secondary active power control is intended to manage the active power and energy balances in the control area, to restore the primary active power reserve, and to participate in the restoration of synchronous zone frequency and synchronous time. It shall be carried out either centrally by means of an automatic generator load management system or by activating the secondary active power reserve within 15 minutes of the receipt of an instruction from the TSO system control operator.

24.1.3. Tertiary active power control is designed to restore the secondary active power reserve and to manage the energy balance in the control area. It shall be carried out by activating the tertiary active power reserve within a maximum period of 12 hours from the receipt of an instruction from the TSO's system control operator;

24.1.4. The TSO is responsible for securing the active power, control of the energy balance, and active power reserves;

24.2. Isolated operation of part of the electricity system is the operation of a part that has been separated from the system and is operating in an asynchronous mode in relation to the main system; the TSO shall assess the need for ensuring the electricity system's stability and balance in the case of isolated operation of the system and shall set, based on the calculations made, the scope of availability of the electricity generating equipment required for the ensuring of the system's stability and balance;

24.3. Load control according to the non-discriminatory principles stipulated in the balancing energy agreements. It enables producers and users to increase production or reduce consumption at a fee;

25. The accident prevention and response plan shall be prepared by the TSO. The plan shall be agreed upon with the DSO and producers connected to the transmission network and the TSOs of neighbouring countries. The TSO must include in the plan appropriate actions and measures for the following cases:

- 25.1. overloading of elements of the transmission network;
- 25.2. voltage or frequency in the transmission network is lowered/increased;
- 25.3. fluctuations of power occur;
- 25.4. active power or energy is lacking for ensuring balance of the control region;
- 25.5. the system has gone down in part or in full in the event of a blackout.

26. In the event of a total blackout, restoration of the system shall be coordinated by the TSO in accordance with a plan prepared and agreed with the TSO and the generators connected to the transmission grid. The plan shall provide for a sequence of actions to gradually restore the operation of the power system: activation of grid elements and increasing generation and load capacities.

Manual load shedding

27. Manual load shedding:

27.1. In the event of an emergency in the energy system when there is a deficiency of electric power or energy in the system, the DSO and users of the transmission network must, as instructed by the TSO, effectively disconnect up to 20% of capacity drawn and limit the daily electricity consumption to 25%;

27.2. TSOs must notify consumers of electricity or power curtailments in advance, but at least 24 hours before the curtailment starts. The notification shall specify the duration, magnitude (queues) and timing of the restriction on the transmission of electricity;

27.3. if it is necessary to introduce power curtailment schedules without delay, the TSO shall notify the

public (consumers) via Radio Lithuania and/or other means of communication at least 1 hour in advance;

27.4. if there is a need to change the declared electricity supply regime, customers may be additionally informed;

27.5. The TSO prepares planned emergency disconnection and curtailment tasks, on the basis of which the STO prepares schedules for emergency disconnections and curtailment of active power and electricity for users connected to its network and the TSO prepares schedules for users directly connected to the transmission network. The schedules are valid for 1 year from 1 November to 31 October;

27.6. User tripping automation consists of Automatic Frequency Tripping (AFT) and Tripping Automation (TA). AFT and TA are triggered by different power system parameters (frequency and voltage drop, respectively), but switch off the same users connected to the AFT devices. The scope and settings of AFT and TA for the transmission and distribution grids shall be determined annually and made available by the TSO;

27.7. according to current agreements between the synchronously operating energy systems, the AFT must disconnect at least 60% of the consumed power;

27.8. the recommended share of electricity restriction is 25% which may be lower depending on feasibility;

28. The following users shall not be connected to automatic user disconnection equipment and shall not be included in the user disconnection schedules: users with uninterrupted and complicated processes a short-term disconnection of which would pose a threat to human life, gives rise to significant material losses, disrupts complicated production processes or important processes in the national/municipal economy, activities of medical treatment establishments, communications, water supply and wastewater removal enterprise, fire safety facilities, railway transport, electrified public transport in the cities, water and air transport control centres, facilities of blocking, alarm and guard systems, pre-school educational establishments, dairy farms, animal husbandry complexes, poultry farms, replacement breeding farms and bread bakeries.

Informing the public

29. Public information on the state of emergency shall be carried out as follows:

29.1. the population, state and municipal institutions and enterprises, other institutions and economic operators shall be warned about the current or imminent emergency situation by the Fire Safety and Rescue Department under the Ministry of Interior (the 'Fire Safety and Rescue Department');

29.2. civil servants and employees shall be warned about the current or imminent emergency situation by the entities of the civil protection system within their remit which shall also be responsible for the warning of institutions, enterprises and other economic operators within the area of their regulation;

29.3. a warning system shall be used to warn the population, state and municipal institutions and enterprises, other institutions and economic operators about the emergency situation, which shall transmit a warning audio signal of civil protection, and information shall be broadcast by the Lithuanian National Radio and Television and by other national, regional and local broadcasters as well as through all other mass media or means of communication used by the public;

29.4. people in residential areas where there are no sirens or the use of the warning system is impossible shall be warned and informed about the emergency situation by available means of communication or other means provided for in the municipal emergency response plans.

30. Public information about an electricity emergency, either current or imminent, shall be provided on a national scale by:

30.1. The Governmental Commission for Emergencies;

30.2. The National Emergency Operations Manager;

30.3. The National Emergency Operations Centre;

30.4. The Fire Safety and Protection Department.

31. If the Minister of Energy has been appointed as the Emergency Operations Manager, the provision of public information shall be organised by the Ministry of Energy:

31.1.1. The Public Information Team of the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) of the Ministry of Energy shall prepare an initial information notice without delay, in coordination with the responsible employees of the Ministry of Energy, crises coordinator and representatives of related energy companies;

31.2. The Leader of the EOC Public Information Team shall coordinate the drafted initial information notice with the EOC Coordinator, members of the EOC Operational Evaluation, Emergency Prevention and

Information Management Team, and representatives of energy companies.

31.3. On agreement, the notice shall be published on the website of the Ministry of Energy (www.enmin.lrv.lt) and transmitted to the Government Commission for Emergencies, the Press Office of the Prime Minister and all main national mass media – press, television and radio.

31.4. On publication of the notice, the EOC Public Information Team monitors information provided by the energy companies about progress in emergency response and prepares interim information releases on important response actions etc.

SECTION TWO REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROCEDURES AND MEASURES

32. The measures applied at regional level, the implementing actors and the description of the measure are presented in the table below.

	Measure	Implementing entity	Description
1.	Cooperation	TSO	The TSO collects and exchanges information related to: - description of the situation in the transmission system; - information about measures being planned.
2.	Cooperation	Competent authorities	Competent authorities analyse and coordinate declaration of an emergency and information exchange between the Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders.
3.	Solidarity mechanism	Competent bodies	Preparedness to apply the solidarity mechanism and exchange of information regarding supply schedule, compensation for expenses, amount of electricity required and prices for electricity.
4.	Changes to repairs schedules	Competent bodies	Coordination of a new schedule of repair works.
5.	IT incident management	Nacional IT security centres, TSO	Cooperation between the IT security centres and TSO's ICT divisions.

33. The basis for regional cooperation:

33.1. the Baltic Power System Balance Management Agreement;

33.2. the HVDC Interconnection Management Agreements;

33.3. the Baltic Disconnection for Isolated Operation from IPS/UPS programme.

34. Regional and bilateral measures:

34.1. Baltic Power System Balance of System Management Agreement for the exchange of emergency power reserves in case of emergencies;

34.2. the NordBalt Interconnector Management Agreement for the exchange of emergency assistance;

34.3. the LitPol Link Interconnection Management Agreement for the exchange of emergency support.

35. In the event of technical or other threats to the continued operation of the Baltic power systems in synchrony with the IPS/UPS, a decision shall be taken to disconnect for isolated operation. A programme has been developed and agreed for this action.

36. The cooperation between TSOs in the IPS/UPS system is governed by the BRELL Agreement. The TSOs cooperate and exchange real-time information on a regular basis. In the event of a disruption to the stable operation of the system, measures are taken to restore the power systems to normal operation, depending on the situation.

CHAPTER V CRISIS COORDINATOR

37. The TSO performs the functions of the crisis coordinator in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/941 and maintains communication and manages information flows in the event of an electricity sector emergency.

38. Contact details of LITGRID AB – the Crisis Coordinator:

address: Karlo Gustavo Emilio Manerheimo str. 8, LT-05131, Vilnius;

telephone: +370 707 02 171;

email: info@litgrid.eu.

39. Functions of the Crisis Coordinator:

39.1. inform electricity enterprises whose equipment is connected to the transmission network about the decision on advance warning taken by the Ministry of Energy

39.2. inform electricity enterprises whose equipment is connected to the transmission network about the recall of the advance warning;

39.3. inform electricity enterprises whose equipment is connected to the transmission network about the declaration of emergency by the Government;

39.4. exchange information with the electricity enterprises and other energy enterprises whose equipment is connected to the transmission network and the disruption of whose operations has necessitated declaration of the emergency;

39.5. provide the electricity enterprises whose equipment is connected to the transmission network with updated information about the emergency;

39.6. provide information about the emergency to ESOC;

39.7. provide the ESOC with technical data on the electricity supply situation during the emergency and take part in the EOC meetings;

39.8. submit reports on the emergency to the Ministry of Energy;

39.9. inform electricity enterprises about the end (recall) of the emergency;

39.10. prepare the final emergency report to the Ministry of Energy.

CHAPTER VI STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

40. The Agency shall prepare the draft Plan in cooperation with the TSO and in consultation with the Ministry of Energy, the Council, the TSO, other stakeholders – electricity producers and service providers, other electricity enterprises and users whose equipment is connected to the transmission network.

41. In the process of drafting of the Plan, the TSO shall provide information/proposals on/for preventive and preparatory measures, regional and bilateral procedures and measures; the Ministry of Energy shall provide information/proposals on general matters related to the draft Plan.

42. The finalised Plan shall be sent to the Council, DSO, other stakeholders – electricity producers and service providers, other electricity enterprises and users whose equipment is connected to the transmission network – for agreement.

43. If necessary, stakeholder meetings can be organised.

44. Under this plan, the following are consulted:

44.1. relevant organisations representing interests of non-industrial electricity consumers;

44.2. relevant organisations representing interests of industrial electricity consumers;

44.3. regulatory bodies;

44.4. transmission system operators;

44.5. relevant distribution system operators.

45. Results achieved in consultation with the entities referred to in point 44 of the Plan:

45.1. national crisis scenarios for the electricity sector identified;

45.2. the identification of the company acting as crisis coordinator;

45.3. the relationship between the electricity crisis and the energy emergency is established.

CHAPTER VII
EMERGENCY TESTS

46. The Ministry of Energy shall test, on a periodic basis but no later than every two years, the efficiency of the procedures established in the Plan for the prevention of the electricity sector crisis including exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms and performs modelling of electricity sector crises.
